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304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction
must apply the law of the applicable state).
2 Prior to Erie, federal courts sitting in diversity
applied general principles of
federal common law as the rule of decision in the absence of statutory authority. See
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842) (announcing that "general principles
and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence" - i.e., federal common law - apply in
diversity cases).
3 This most frequently happens in diversity cases. Federal law provides for federal subject-matter jurisdiction over suits between citizens of different states. See 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1994). The situation can also arise, however, when the federal
court's jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for federal subjectmatter jurisdiction over suits involving a federal question. See, e.g., Imel v. United
States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975) (explaining that the resolution of a federal tax
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As it is with most aspects of the law, the Erie doctrine is easier
stated than applied. Locating the proper state rule of decision, even
in well-developed areas of state law, can be a difficult task.4 For most
cases, the federal judge faced with a state law issue of.first impression
has three options: (1) hazard a well-informed guess as to what the
state courts would say were they to address the issue,5 (2) abstain in
favor of the state court deciding the issue,6 or (3) certify the question
to the highest court of the state whose substantive rule of decision
governs.7 The first of these options, this Article will suggest, substilaw issue is governed by state law regarding apportionment of property). The need
to apply state law also arises when the court is required to resolve a dispute when exercising supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994) (stating that federal
courts have jurisdiction over non-federal claims that are so related to federal claims
"that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution").
4 See generally Note, How A Federal Court Determines State Law, 59 HARV. L.
REV.
1299 (1946). Judge Friendly colorfully described this process: "Our principal task,
in this diversity of citizenship case, is to determine what the New York courts would
think the California courts would think on an issue about which neither has
thought." Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960).
5 See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 58, 397 (5th ed. 1994) [hereinafter
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS]. As the author explains,
The federal court must keep in mind, however, that its function is not
to choose the rule which it would adopt for itself, if free to do so, but
to choose the rule which it believes the state court, from all that is
known about its methods of reaching decisions, is likely in the future
to adopt.
Id.
Pullman-style abstention, named eponymously after the case of Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), is the most applicable abstention doctrine when issues of state law arise in diversity cases. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1073 (1997) ("Certification today covers territory
once dominated by a deferral device called 'Pullman abstention."'). Under this doctrine, a federal court abstains in favor of state court adjudication of unsettled issues
of state law that dispose of a case without the need for deciding issues of federal constitutional law present in the controversy. See generally 17A CHARLESA. WRIGHT ET AL.,
JURISDICTION 2D § 4241 (2d ed. 1988)
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
[hereinafter WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &PROCEDURE]. Though generally applied only when resolution of the unsettled state law issue would obviate the need
for deciding a federal constitutional issue, a variant of Pullman abstention that is
closely related in effect to certification has been applied even where there exist no
constitutional or statutory issues of a public nature. See id. § 4246 (compiling cases).
For a general discussion of the abstention doctrines, see WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS,
supra note 5, § 52 at 322-39; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT, TENTATIVE DRAYr No. 2, 144-45 (April 14, 1998).
7 Though the scope of this Article is limited to the question
of interjurisdictional certification from federal to state courts, similar issues are present
when a state court must apply the law of a foreign state. For a thoughtful discussion
of certification in this context, see generally Ira P. Robbins, Interstate Certification of
Questions of Law: A Valuable Process in Need of Reform, 76 JUDICATURE 125 (1992)
[hereinafter Robbins, Interstate Certification].
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tutes federal common-law making for state common-law making and,
at the very least, exists in considerable tension with the philosophy
and teaching of Erie. The second option, abstention, while allowing
the state courts to decide state law issues, is a rarely applied and awkward procedural device that forces parties to litigate their claims first
in a state trial court and then through any available appeals before
obtaining a definitive answer to the unsettled state law question. Abstention, not surprisingly, is prone to causing enormous delays, expense, and inconvenience to both courts and litigants." Therefore, it
is an inadequate solution to the problem presented by state law issues
of first impression arising in federal cases. The third option, certification, provides the benefits of state court adjudication of state law
issues of first impression without the inordinate delay that often accompanies abstention. Unlike abstention, certification directly presents a question to the highest court of the state.
While most states in the union have adopted certification procedures, New Jersey is one of the few that has not.9 Consideration of
whether New Jersey should adopt a certification procedure is currently pending before the New Jersey Supreme Court.10 This Article
will set forth the reasons, both practical and philosophical, why the
New Jersey Supreme Court both can and should adopt a certification
procedure. Part I of the Article briefly surveys the historical development of the certification procedure and discusses the issues likely
to be considered by the New Jersey Supreme Court in deciding
whether to adopt a certification procedure. Part II of the Article
summarizes arguments that have developed in the substantial body of
scholarly literature and judicial opinions on the subject of certification in general. Next, this part addresses the chief objections to certification raised by the Supreme Court Committee on Civil Practice
8 See Gerald M. Levin, Note, Inter-JurisdictionalCertification: Beyond
Abstention To-

ward CooperativeJudicialFederalism, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 344, 346-48 (1963).
9 Certification procedures have been adopted in varying forms by 46 states, the
District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. New Jersey is one of
the four states, along with Arkansas, North Carolina, and Vermont, that has not
adopted such a procedure. SeeJona Goldschmidt, American Judicature Society, Certification of Questions of Law: Federalism in Practice 1, 117-18 (1995). With the adoption of Rule 29.5 in January of this year, California has become the most recent state
to adopt a certification procedure. See CAL. R. CT. 29.5. On October 28, 1998, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a rule that provides for certification on a oneyear trial basis, effective January 1, 1999. See In re: Certification of Questions of Law,
No. 197Judicial Administration Docket No. 1 (Oct. 28, 1998).
See COMMITTEE ON CIVIL PRACTicE, 1998 REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL PRACTICE (Jan. 15, 1998) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT]. This

report, including its conclusions and recommendations, is discussed in further detail
in Part II of this Article, infra.
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in its report on certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court.", Finally, this Part explores whether such a procedure would be constitutional, whether issuing an opinion answering a certified question
would constitute an advisory opinion, and whether certification
would place an unwarranted burden on the New Jersey Supreme
Court." Part III discusses the specific type of certification procedure
that would most benefit New Jersey and federal judges applying New
Jersey law.
I.
A.

HistoricalDevelopment of InterjurisdictionalCertificationin the
United States

The ability of a federal court to request an authoritative determination from a state's highest court when faced with an uncertain
question of state law is a relatively new phenomenon in American jurisprudence. In 1945, Florida became the first state to enact a statute
enabling the United States Supreme Court, any circuit court of appeals, or the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to certify questions to the Florida Supreme Court. 3 The procedure, however, lay

H See COMMITTEE REPORT,
1

supra note 10, at 254-55.

The majority of scholarly opinion weighs in favor of certification.

See, e.g.,

Jerome I. Braun, A CertificationRule for California,36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 935, 937-42

(1996). See supra note 9 (noting that California subsequently adopted a certification
procedure). See generally Vincent L. McKusick, Certification: A Procedurefor Cooperation Between State and Federal Courts, 16 ME. L. REv. 33 (1964) (arguing in favor of certification procedures generally); J. Michael Medina, The IntejurisdictionalCertification
of Questions of Law Experience: Federal, State and Oklahoma - Should Arkansas Follow?
45 ARK. L. REv. 99 (1992) (arguing in favor of certification procedure for Arkansas
courts); Robbins, Interstate Certification, supra note 7; Ira P. Robbins, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act: A Proposal for Reform, 18 J. LEGIS. 127 (1992)
[hereinafter Robbins, Proposalfor Reform] (arguing in favor of revised certification
statute); Steila L. Smetanka, To Predict or To Certify Unresolved Questions of State Law: A
Proposalfor Federal Court Certification to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 68 TEMP. L.
REv. 725 (1995) (arguing in favor of certification procedure for Pennsylvania
courts). Pennsylvania has not adopted a permanent certification procedure. But see
supra note 9 (noting that Pennsylvania has adopted a temporary certification rule).
13 See 1945 Fla. Laws ch. 23098 § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West
1997)). The Florida Supreme Court implemented the certification procedure by
enacting FLA. APP. R. 9.150. See In re Florida Appellate Rules, 127 So. 2d 444 (Fla.
1961) (enacting precursor to Rule 9.150). As early as 1909, however, Justice Holmes
presaged the use of certification by noting that such a procedure "dispose [s] of cases
in the least cumbersome and most expeditious way." Chicago B. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 214 U.S 492, 495-96 (1909).
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dormant until 1960 when the United States Supreme Court first
raised the certification issue in Clay v. Sun InsuranceOffice, Ltd.'4
Florida's example has been followed with increasing frequency
over the last thirty-eight years.' 5 In 1971, when Professors Richard B.
Lillich and Raymond T. Mundy addressed the pros and cons of certification by federal courts, only seven states had adopted a certification procedure.'6 By 1976 fifteen states allowed certification. 17 Today, forty-six states have provided by constitution, court rule, or
statute that federal courts, or, in some cases, other state courts may
obtain an authoritative determination of the applicable state law. 8
14 363 U.S. 207 (1960). Though not utilized by United States
courts, a procedure for certifying questions of law to courts within a multi-sovereign system has in
fact existed for a considerable time in the British Commonwealth. See Robbins, Proposalfor Reform, supra note 12, at 131-32 (tracing the origins of certification procedure to the British Law Ascertainment Act of 1859).
15 See Robbins, Proposalfor Reform, supra note 12, at 165 (noting
that 26 of the 40
jurisdictions that, as of 1992, had adopted certification procedures, did so after
1975). Since 1992, when Professor Robbins's article appeared in the HarvardJournal
on Legislation, five additional states have enacted a certification procedure, and
Pennsylvania has adopted a certification procedure on a one-year trial basis, see supra
note 9.
16 See Richard B. Lillich & Raymond T. Mundy, Federal Court Certification of Doubtful State Law Questions, 18 UCLA L. REv. 888, 888 (1971).
17 See Note, Civil Procedure Scope of Certification in Diversity Jurisdiction, 29
RUTGE1.SL. REV. 1155, 1156 n.6 (1976) [hereinafter Note, Civil Procedure].
is See ALA. R. App. P. 18; ALASKA R. App. P. 407; ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1861
(West 1994), ARIz. Sup. CT. R. 27; CAL. R. CT. 29.5; COLO. R. App. P. 21.1; CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-199a (West 1997); CONN. R. App. P. §§ 82-1 to -7; DEL. CONST.
art. IV, § 11(9); DEL SUP. CT. R 41; D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-723 (1981 & 1987 Supp.);
D.C. CT. App. R. 54; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West
1997); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.150; GA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-9 (1998); GA. R. S. CT. 46; HAw. R.
APP. P. 13; IDAHO APp. R. 12.1; ILL. Sup. CT. R. 20; IND. CODE ANN. § 33-2-4-1 (West
1996); IND. R. App. P. 15(0); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 684.A.1-A.11 (West 1998); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3201-60-3212 (1994); KY. R. Civ. P. 76.37; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13:72.1 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); LA. Sup CT. R. XII; ME. R. Civ. P. 76B; MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 12-601 to -609 (1997); MAss. R. CT. 1:03; MIcH. CT. R.
7.305; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.061 (West 1993); Miss. Sup. CT. R. 20; Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 477.004 (West 1993) (held unconstitutionalby Grantham v. Missouri Department of
Corrections, No. 72576, 1990 WL 602159, at *1 (Mo. Jul. 13, 1990)); MONT. R. App.
P. 44; NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-219 to -225 (1997); NEV. R. App. P. 5; N.H. Sup. CT. R. 34;
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-7-1 to 7-10 (Michie 1997); N.M. R. App. P. 12-607; N.Y. CT. R.
§ 500.17; N.D. R. App. P. 47; OHIO SuP. CT. PRAC. R. XVIII; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§§ 1601-1611 (West 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 28.200-.255 (1997); OR. R. App. P.
12.20; P.R. Sup. CT. 27; R.I. Sup. CT. R. 6; S.C. R. App. P. 228; S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§
15-24A-1 to 15-24A-11 (Michie 1994); S.D. Sup. CT. R. 85-7; TENN. SUP. CT. R. 23; TEX.
R. APP. P. 214 (Texas Court of Criminal Appeals); TEX. R. APP. P. 114 (Texas Su-

preme Court); UTAH R. App. P. 41; VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:42; WASH. REV. CODE

§§

2.60.010 to 2.60.900 (West 1998); WASH. SuP. CT. R. 16.16; W. VA. CODE §§ 51-lA-1
to -13 (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 821.01 to 821.12 (West 1994); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 113-106 (Michie 1994); Wyo. R. App. P. 11.01-.07; see also Goldschmidt, supra note 9,
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Scholarly andJudicialCommentary: Broad Supportfor

InterjurisdictionalCertification
The almost universal adoption of certification procedures
among the fifty states stems from the nearly unanimous endorsement
certification has received from major American legal institutions, legal scholars, and judges who have addressed the issue. In 1967, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws initiated the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act,' 9 which was
subsequently revised by the commissioners at its national conference
in July of 1995.20 In 1969, the American Law Institute followed suit

and strongly endorsed certification.
In 1977, the Judicial Administration Division of the American Bar Association urged those courts
that had not adopted a certification procedure to do so. 2 At the National Conference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships held in Orlando, Florida, in 1992, certification was recognized by both federal
and state judges in attendance as a means by which state-federal relations could be enhanced. 3 In 1995, the Committee on Long Range
Planning of the United States Judicial Conference also "encouraged
states to adopt certification procedures where they do not currently
exist.2 4 In the Same year, the American Judicature Society published
its exhaustive study on all aspects of certification with the stated purpose of "facilitat[ing] the certification procedure
where it exists and
25
not.
does
it
where
adoption
its
encourag[ing]
at 117 app. A: Sources of Authority for State Certification Procedures. Since the
AJS publication, California became the forty-fifth state to adopt a certification rule.
In addition, Pennsylvania has adopted a certification procedure on a trial basis beginningJanuary 1, 1999. See supra note 9.
UNIF. CERTIF. OF QUFSTIONS OF LAwAcr (1967), 12 U.L.A.
86 (1996).
20

See

UNIF. CERTIF. OF QUESTIONS OF LAW [ACT] [RuLE]

(1995), 12 U.L.A. 71

(1996); see also Goldschmidt, supra note 9, at 101-02 (discussing the 1995 revisions).
21 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DmSION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, OFFICIAL DRAFT § 137(e) (1969). Although the ALI reporters on the subject of certification opposed a recommendation favoring certification, a large majority of the Institute voted in favor of certification. See id. Commentary to Subsection (e), at 292.
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO APP. CTs. (1994).
23 The conference was convened by the Federal Judicial Center and
the State
Justice Institute and "was attended by 300 state and federal judges, scholars, administrators, practicing attorneys, and government officials," Goldschmidt, supra note 9,

at 104, making it "the largest gathering in history convened for the express purpose
of discussing issues ofjudicial federalism." William Schwarzer, "Letter to Our Readers," in FJC Directions: Special State-FederalIssue (A Distillation of Ideasfrom the National
Conference on State-FederalJudicialRelationships) 1 (1993).
1 COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED
STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (Mar. 1995).
25

Goldschmidt, supra note 9, at 2.

1998]

NEWJERSEY CERTIFICATION

497

The increased adoption by the states since 1965 of a procedure
by which a court of the United States may certify a question of state
law to the highest court of a state, and its endorsement by significant
American legal institutions, has spawned a vast amount of literature. 6
See generally John R. Brown, Certification-Federalism

In Action, 7 CuMB. L. REV.

455 (1977); Michael H. Cardozo, Choosing and Declaring State Law: Deference to State
Courts Versus Federal Responsibility, 55 Nw. L. REv. 419 (1960); Paul L. Caron, The Role
of State Court Decisions in Federal Tax Litigation: Bosch, Erie, and Beyond, 71 OR. L.
REV. 781 (1962); Richard A. Chase, A State Court's Refusal to Answer Certified Questions:
Are Inferences Permitted?, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 407 (1992); Charles E. Clark, Federal
ProceduralReform and States'Right-, to a More Perfect Union, 40 TEX. L. REv. 211 (1962);
Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L. REv. 899 (1989); The Committee on Federal Courts, Analysis of State Laws Providingfor Certification by FederalCourts of Determinative State Issues of Law, 42 THE RECORD 101 (1987); John B. Corr, Thoughts on the
Vitality of Erie, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1087 (1992);John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, InterjurisdictionalCertification and Choice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REv. 411 (1988); Theodore B.
Eichelberger, Certification Statutes: Engineering a Solution to Pullman Abstention Delay,
59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1339 (1984); Robert H. Hall, FederalCourts, State Law and Certification, 23 GA. ST. B.J. 120 (Feb. 1987); Charles J. Hanemann, Certification to State
Courts: Progressin the Field of FederalAbstention, 36 TUL. L. REv. 5711 (1962); Scott W.
Johnson, Rethinking Certification, 51 BENCH & B. 27 (Oct. 1994); Stanton S. Kaplan,
Certificationof Questionsfrom Federal Appellate Courts to the Florida Supreme Court and its
Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 413 (1962); Philia B. Kurland,
Toward a Co-OperativeJudicial Federalism: The Federal Courts Abstention Doctrine, 24
F.R.D. 481 (1959); Paul A. LaBel, Legal Positivism and Federalism: The CertificationExperience, 19 GA. L. REv. 999 (1985); Lillich & Mundy, supra note 16; Brian Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the FederalCourts,
23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 717 (1969); McKusick, supra note 12; Medina, supra note 12;
Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and
Federal QuestionJurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369 (1992); RogerJ. Miner, The Tensions of a Dual Court System and Some Prescriptionsfor Relief 51 ALB. L. REv. 151 (1987);
Lawrence L. Piersol, Certifying Questions to State Supreme Courts as a Remedy to the Abstention Doctrine, 9 S.D. L. REV. 158 (1964); Robbins, Interstate Certification, supra note
7; Robbins, Proposalfor Reform, supra note 12; David W. Robertson, Inter-Sovereign Certification as an Answer to the Abstention Problem, 21 LA. L. REv. 777 (1961); JackJ. Rose,
Erie R.R. and State Power to Control State Law: Switching Tracks to New Certification of
Questions of Law Procedures, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 421 (1989); Larry M. Roth, Certified
Questionsfrom the Federal Courts: Review and Re-proposal, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1979);
John A. Scanelli, The Casefor Certification,12WM. & MARY L. REv. 627 (1971); Dolores
K. Sloviter, Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 76 JUDICATURE 90
(1992); Smetanka, supra note 12; Allan D. Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36
IOWAL. REV. 629 (1951); Winton D. Woods, The Salve Regina Case: PuttingErie Back
on Track, 32 ARIz. L. REV. 773 (1990); GeriJ. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining
in the Use of Certification, 47 ARK. L. REv. 305 (1994) [hereinafter Yonover I]; Geri J.
Yonover, Ascertaining State Law: The Continuing Erie Dilemma, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 1
(1988) [hereinafter Yonover II]; Note, Abstention and Certification in Diversity Suits:
Perfection of Means and Confusion of Goals, 73 YALE L.J. 850 (1964); Note, Abstention Election of Forum and Intersovereign Certification, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 895 (1964); Note,
Civil Procedure,supra note 17; Levin, supra note 8; Drake A. Titze, Note, Giving Deference to State Law: New South Dakota CertificationStatutes EnableFederal Courts to Defer to
Supreme Court, 30 S.D. L. Rev. 180 (1984); Note, The Uniform Certification of Questions
of Law Act, 55 IOWA L. REV. 465 (1969) [hereinafter Note, Uniform Certification]. A
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The commentary in this large corpus of legal literature has been
favorable, for the most part, to the use of interjurisdictional certification. 7 Proponents point to the following factors in support of interjurisdictional certification:
" Certification promotes comity and cooperative federalism by
allowing the highest court of each state to develop governing
principles of state substantive law.28
" Certification avoids judicial guesswork and the concomitant
risk that the federal court will incorrectly determine the rule
of decision.2
detailed survey of this considerable body of legal scholarship is beyond the scope of
this Article. The reader is referred to the American Judicature Society Report,
Goldschmidt, supra note 9, which has not only assembled in Appendix B a bibliography of certification literature, but has also provided a short synopsis of each article.
27 See, e.g., Medina, supra note 12, at 103 n.21 (collecting
favorable articles);
Note, Civil Procedure,supra note 17, at 1156 n.11 (collecting favorable articles).
28 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 26, at 455 (suggesting
that certification allows state
courts to formulate important public policy determinations affecting state interests);
LaBel, supra note 26 (arguing that the rule of decision should be determined by the
court system in which it is to have effect); McKusick, supra note 12 (maintaining that
certification promotes comity, reduces friction of the dual-court system and maintains the diversity jurisdiction goal of reducing bias against out-of-state litigants by
retaining federal fact finding but allowing the state Supreme Court to fashion an
appropriate rule of decision); Medina, supra note 12, at 164 (listing the fact that Arkansas courts would be able to make definitive determination of state law as a benefit of adopting interjurisdictional certification procedure in Arkansas); Robbins, ProposalforReform, supra note 12, at 134.
See Braun, supra note 12, at 936-38 (summarizing cases in which federal courts
incorrectly predicted state law); Clark, supra note 26, at 223 (arguing that federal
courts under Erie are apt to impose their values or commit error in determining
state law); Corr & Robbins, supra note 26, at 414 & n.l1 (collecting cases in which
state Supreme Courts have rejected federal court rulings on state law issues of first
impression); Levin, supra note 8, at 350 (opining that certification prevents federal
encroachment upon state law-making); Sloviter, supra note 26, at 92 (collecting cases
in which federal courts have incorrectly predicted Pennsylvania law); Smetanka, supra note 12, at nn. 24-96 (analyzing Third Circuit cases that incorrectly predicted
course of Pennsylvania law). The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in
the sky, but rather a set ofjudge-made rules created in part based on individual and
institutional experience, intuition, and cultural bias. This institutional bias creates a
systemic federal distortion in the development of state law that is contrary to fundamental principles of federalism. AsJudge Becker put it: "States like NewJersey lacking certification procedures face the threat that federal courts will misanalyze the
state's law, already open to varied interpretations, by inadvertently viewing it
through the lens of their own federal jurisprudential assumptions." Hakimoglu v.
Trump Taj Mahal Assoc., 70 F.3d 291, 302 (3rd Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., dissenting).
In Hakimoglu, for example, Judge Becker argued that the majority, which had concluded that the state's extensive regulation of the casino industry precluded a common law cause of action advanced by an intoxicated casino patron, reached the
wrong result by misapplying an essentially federal view of preemption - viz., that
common law causes of action are preempted when state regulation "occupies the
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e Certification furthers the underlying principle of Erie elimination of forum shopping - through the development
of a single definitive statement of state substantive law.
* Certification realizes the goals of Pullman abstention - deference to state determination of state law issues - while
avoiding the delays that accompany this procedure.'
field" - lacking a developed state law counterpart. NewJersey federal courts have,
on occasion, incorrectly predicted the course of New Jersey law or have disagreed
with intermediate state appellate courts addressing the same issues. In Nemtin v. Zarin, 577 F. Supp. 1135 (D.N.J. 1983), the court interpreted NewJersey's Casino Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-1 to -14 (West 1996), as permitting only casino licensees or persons licensed under the act to extend credit to gamblers. See Zarin, 577 F.
Supp. at 1145. Two years later, a NewJersey appellate division court considered the
same issue, declined to follow Zarin, and reached the opposite result. See Gottlob v.
Lopez, 205 N.J. Super. 417, 420, 501 A.2d 176, 177 (App. Div. 1985) (loans by nonlicensees are beyond the scope of the Casino Control Act), certif. denied, 104 N.J. 373,
517 A.2d 384 (1986). In Kowalsky v. Long Beach Township, 72 F.3d 385 (3rd Cir.
1995), the Third Circuit held that, for purposes of NewJersey's Tort Claims Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to -12 (West 1996), the beaches on Long Beach Island, New Jersey constituted unimproved property, and that the governmental defendants were
therefore immune from liability. See Kowalsky, 72 F.3d at 388 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 59:4-8 ("[N]either a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury
caused by a condition of any unimproved public property, including but not limited
to any ... beach.")). A New Jersey appellate court considered the issue two years
later and reached the opposite result, specifically rejecting the holding in Kowalski
See Fleuhr v. City of Cape May, 303 N.J. Super. 481, 697 A.2d 182 (App. Div.), certif
granted, 152 N.J. 12, 702 A.2d 351 (1997). Of course, it goes without saying that New
Jersey federal judges have also correctly predicted the course of NewJersey law. See,
e.g., Itzkoff v. F & G Realty of New Jersey Corp., 890 F. Supp. 351 (D.N.J. 1995)
(correctly predicting that New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine would bar litigation of a claim that could have been brought in an earlier proceeding in New York);
Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 336, 662 A.2d
536 (1995) (same).
30 See Scanelli, supra note 26, at 641 (certification promotes the "spirit" of Erie by
encouraging consistency of result).
31 See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1073 (1997)
("Certification procedure, in contrast [to Pullman abstention], allows a federal court
faced with a novel state-law question to put the question directly to the State's highest court, reducing delay, cutting the cost, and increasing the assurance of gaining
an authoritative response.'); Corr & Robins, supra note 26, at 416-17 (stating that
certification avoids delays associated with abstention because, unlike in Pullman abstention, litigants need not try their case in the lower state courts before obtaining a
definitive answer from the highest state court); Note, Civil Procedure, supra note 17
(arguing that certification avoids burdensomeness of abstention). Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) holds that the federal court should not decide issues of federal constitutional law if there are unsettled questions of state law
that resolve the case without the necessity of deciding the constitutional issue. See id.
If the federal court orders abstention, the litigants are required to commence an action in state court for a declaratory judgment on the state law issues. See WRIGHT,
FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 5, at 324. While the Pullman doctrine serves to support
important principles of federalism, it often results in substantial delay and expense.
See, e.g., Belotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1975) (advocating the use of certifica-
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Federal judges echo this enthusiastic endorsement of the certification procedure. The certification of questions of state law from a
federal court to the highest court of the state first caught national attention in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. Clay involved a suit on an
insurance contract brought in a diversity action in Florida. The policy had a provision, valid in Illinois where the contract was made, that
prohibited suits brought more than twelve months after discovery of
the loss. By statute, Florida prohibited such contractual limitations.
Rather than deciding whether the Florida statute applied to a contract in Illinois, the Fifth Circuit held, as a matter of federal constitutional law, that the Florida statute could not be applied to contracts
made elsewhere. Clay presented many of the standard features of
Pullman-type abstention. The constitutional issue would not have to
be reached if, under Florida law, the Florida statute did not apply to
the Illinois contract. Further, any decision by the federal court regarding the applicability of the Florida statute would not be an
authoritative statement of Florida law. Finally, no authoritative
statement from the Florida Supreme Court governed interpretation
of the statute at issue. The United States Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Frankfurter, acknowledged the Florida Legislature
for its "rare foresight" in authorizing the Florida Supreme Court to
adopt rules allowing it to receive questions of state law certified to it
by a federal appellate court and directed that the procedure be
used.34
Certification achieved a more prominent role in the federal
courts in 1974 when the United States Supreme Court endorsed the
use of certification in a diversity case that raised no constitutional istion rather than Pullman abstention in part because of the delay inherent in the abstention process). Certification is seen as a remedy to this delay since it routes the
litigants directly to the state Supreme Court rather than to the state's trial court with
its subsequent appeals. See Eichelberger, supra note 26; Piersol, supra note 26.
32 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
3 Clay differed somewhat from typical Pullman abstention cases
in that it was an
action at law between private parties. See supra notes 6 & 31 and authorities cited
therein for a discussion of Pullman abstention. See generally WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 6, § 4248 at 162.
34 See Clay, 363 U.S. at 212. After receiving the Supreme
Court's endorsement,
the Fifth Circuit enthusiastically availed itself of the procedure. See WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 6, § 4248 at 162 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's development of certification jurisprudence). Recognizing the potentially
broad ambit of certification, the Fifth Circuit has since certified state law questions
not only where federal constitutional issues can be avoided, as under traditional
Pullman abstention, but also in diversity cases lacking a federal issue. See id.; see also
Brown, supra note 26, at 455 (discussing the use of certification in "plain vanilla" diversity cases that do not raise federal constitutional issues). Judge Brown was, at the
time the article was written, the ChiefJudge of the Fifth Circuit.
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sues. 5 In Lehman Brothers v. Schein,6 the Supreme Court discussed the
propriety of certification in the context of a shareholder's derivative
suit brought in federal court under the diversity statute. The district
court in New York, interpreting Florida law, found no liability.37 The
Second Circuit reversed, reasoning that, in the absence of controlling Florida authority, the Florida Supreme Court would "probably"
adopt the New York rule, which provided for a rule of liability under
the circumstances of the case. 8 The United States Supreme Court
vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Second Circuit
to consider whether it should avail itself of Florida's certification
procedure.
Justice Douglas, however, strongly suggested that the Second
Circuit take advantage of Florida's certification procedure:
We do not suggest that where there is doubt as to local law
and where the certification procedure is available, resort to it is
obligatory. It does, of course, in the long run save time, energy,
and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism.
Its use in a given case rests in the sound discretion of the federal
court.
Here resort to it would seem particularly appropriate in
view of the novelty of the question and the great unsettlement of
Florida law, Florida being a distant state. When federal judges in
New York attempt to predict uncertain Florida law, they act, as we
have referred to ourselves on this Court in matters of state law, as
"outsiders" lacking the common exposure to local law which
comes from sitting in the jurisdiction.
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court again expressed its
enthusiasm for the certification process in Bellotti v. Baird.40 This case
fit the Pullman-type abstention doctrine since the constitutionality of
an unconstrued state statute requiring parental consent for an abortion for minor unmarried daughters might be avoided or affected
depending on how a court construed the statute. Noting that delay
might mitigate against abstention, the Supreme Court reembraced
certification, rather than Pullman abstention, as a means to obtain a
35 See CARROLL SERON,

CERTIFYING QUESTIONS OF STATE LAw:

EXPERIENCE

OF

FEDERALJUDGES (Federal Judicial Center Staff Paper 1983); see also Note, Civil Procedure, supra note 17, at 1175 (showing that the Supreme Court's Lehman Brothers deci-

sion "encouraged" increased use of certification).
416 U.S. 386 (1973).
37 See id. at 388.

See Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822-23 (2d Cir. 1973).

39 Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 390-91.
40 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
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definition of state law from the appropriate judicial office.1 In directing the District Court to utilize Massachusetts's certification procedure, the Supreme Court, through Justice Blackman, observed:
The importance of speed in resolution of the instant case is manifest. Each day the statute is in effect, irretrievable events, with
substantial personal consequences, occur. Although we do not
mean to intimate that abstention would be improper in this case
were certification not possible, the availability of certification
greatly simplifies the analysis.42
The United States Supreme Court's most recent approval of the
certification process came in the 1997 case, Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,4 a case involving a challenge to an Arizona constitutional amendment purporting to make English the official language
of the state; the District Court declared the statute overbroad." In so
doing, the District Court broadly construed the statute in question to
prohibit any use of the English language by Arizonan officials and
explicitly declined to seek a more narrow (and possibly constitutionally permitted) construction of the statute from the Arizona Supreme
Court using the certification procedure.45 The Ninth Circuit adopted
the District Court's construction of the Arizona statute, and, like the
District Court, explicitly declined to certify the matter to the Arizona
Supreme Court.4 6 The Supreme Court ultimately held that the case
had become moot during its pendency and vacated the judgments of
the lower courts.47 The Supreme Court, however, went on to criticize
the District Court and Ninth Circuit for failing to avail themselves of
Arizona's certification procedure:
Both lower federal courts in this case refused to invite the aid of
the Arizona Supreme Court because they found the language of
Article XXVIII "plain .... " A more cautious approach was in order ....Novel, unsettled questions of state law... not "unique
circumstances," are necessary before federal courts may avail
themselves of state certification procedures. These procedures do
not entail the delays, expense, and procedural complexity that
generally attend abstention decisions .... The course of
Yniguez's case was complex. The complexity might have been
avoided had the District Court, more than eight years ago, ac41
42

43
45
46
47

See id. at 150-51.
Id. at 151.
117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997).
See id. at 1062.
See id.
See id. at 1066.
See id. at 1072.
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cepted the certification suggestion made by Arizona's Attorney
General.48
Third Circuit jurisprudence is equally supportive of the certifica-

tion process. " In Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Associates,'o the Third
Circuit was forced to predict whether the New Jersey Supreme Court
would recognize a right to recover from a casino for gambling losses
resulting from the casino's continued service of alcohol to an intoxicated patron." The majority predicted that the New Jersey Supreme
Court would not recognize recovery of this sort and affirmed the
dismissal of the plaintiffs claims."' In his dissent, Judge Becker argued:
The lack of a certification procedure disadvantages both New Jersey and the federal judiciary. Especially in cases such as this
where little authority governs the result, the litigants are left to
watch the federal court spin the wheel. Meanwhile, federal
judges, by no means a high-rolling bunch, are put in the uncomfortable position of making a choice."3

Judge Becker argued that the absence of a certification procedure
forces federal judges to formulate state policy in violation of fundamental principles of federalism and results in the distorted adjudication of state law issues when federal judges resolve unsettled state law
issues by applying federal jurisprudential assumptions.
New Jersey's federal district judges also have expressed their
support for a certification procedure. In Tyson v. Cigna Corp.,55 the

Id. at 1074-75.
Other Circuit Courts have also expressed enthusiasm for the certification
process. See, e.g., Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673, 674 (5th Cir. 1963)
(publicly expressing appreciation for answer to certified question and noting that
the "answer has saved this Court, through the writer as its organ, from committing a
serious error as to the law of Florida which might have resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice"); see also Braun, supra note 12, at 935-40 (compiling federal cases
supporting the use of the certification process). This Article will focus on Third Circuit jurisprudence in this area.
70 F.3d 291 (3rd Cir. 1995).
51 See id. at 292.
52 See id. at 294.
53 Id. at 302 (Becker, J., dissenting). Though Judge Becker wrote
in dissent, the
two other judges on the panel, Judge Alito and Judge Nygaard, both
"enthusiastically" joined the portion of Judge Becker's dissent discussing certification. See id. at 293 & n.2; see also Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 155 n.4 (3rd
Cir. 1998) ("This case again demonstrates the difficulties associated with the lack of
a certification procedure in NewJersey.").
See id. at 302 (Becker, J., dissenting). This issue is discussed supra at text accom 5panying note 29.
918 F. Supp. 836 (D.NJ. 1996).
48

49
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plaintiff brought claims under, among other provisions, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD).56 After dismissing the federal
claims against the individual defendants, the remaining question before the District Court was whether the LAD permitted claims against
individual, as opposed to corporate, defendants - an issue as to
which no dispositive authority existed. According to Judge Irenas:
This determination will involve us in a close analysis of a vague
state statute. It is yet another example of the desirability of implementing a procedure which would permit New Jersey's federal
courts to certify important, unresolved issues of state law to state
courts so that New Jersey itself is given the opportunity to resolve
the ambiguities of its laws.57
Judge Orlofsky has, on several occasions, urged the New Jersey
Supreme Court to adopt a certification procedure. In Hulmes v.
Honda Motor Co.,ssJudge Orlofsky had to predict how the New Jersey
Supreme Court would decide the question of "whether the entire
controversy doctrine bars a second action when the first suit, a 'John
Doe' action, was inadvertently dismissed with prejudice one week after it was filed." 59 Judge Orlofsky, who ultimately decided that the entire controversy doctrine did not apply, urged New Jersey to adopt a
certification procedure to answer questions such as the one raised by
this case. 60 Later in the same litigation,Judge Orlofsky was again confronted by an unsettled question of state law, specifically, whether
evidence regarding the plaintiffs blood alcohol level constituted
admissible evidence under New Jersey law.6' Once again, Judge Orlofsky strongly urged adoption of a certification procedure in New
Jersey.62
The experience of both federal and state judges familiar with
certification, as evidenced by numerous empirical studies of certification, also supports the conclusion that certification is the most effecNJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-10 to -49 (West 1996).
Tyson, 918 F. Supp. at 838-39 n.3.
924 F. Supp. 673 (D.N.J. 1996).
Id. at 678.
CI See id.
61See Hulmes v. Honda Motor Co., 936 F. Supp. 195, 198 (D.N.J. 1996).
62 See id. at 211 n.2. Judge Orlofsky has expressed similar sentiments in
several
other published decisions. See generally Singer v. Land Rover North America, Inc.,
955 F. Supp. 359 (D.NJ. 1997) (deciding whether former lessee can recover from
manufacturer of automobile under New Jersey's "Lemon Law"); Trump Hotels &
Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 395 (D.NJ. 1997)
(determining whether funding mechanism for highway and tunnel project in Atlantic City, NewJersey violated the casino gambling amendment to the NewJersey Constitution).
57
58
59
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tive and efficient means to ensure that the proper tribunal decides
unsettled issues of state law. The first systematic empirical analysis of
judicial experience with certification processes was conducted in
1983 by the Research Division of the Federal Judicial Center (FJC).
The study's mission was to evaluate the effectiveness of certification
procedures and to determine whether their advantages outweighed
their disadvantages. 3
The results of the study indicate wide acceptance and approval
of the certification process among federal circuit and district judges.
The study polled forty-nine district and appellate judges from nine
circuits encompassing twenty-four states and the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico - the jurisdictions that at the time allowed certification
in some form - about their experience with certification."
The overwhelming majority of the judges surveyed found that
the certification procedure, "appropriately used, is a useful and effective mechanism for resolving state questions that arise in federal
courts .
The study concluded that 'judges use the procedure as it
was originally intended, namely, to afford state courts a first opportunity to interpret their own laws, to avoid federal-state conflict, and
to provide definitive precedent in both systems."6 Further, while the
study acknowledged that the certification procedure adds an appreciable delay to individual proceedings in which it is utilized, the disadvantage of delay is outweighed by the procedure's advantages viz., obtaining an accurate answer from the appropriate
tribunal and
7
improving relations between state and federal courts.C
63 See SERON, supra note 35.

See id. at v, 21-23. The study polled the following Circuits: First (Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island); Fourth (Maryland, West Virginia); Fifth (Louisiana, Mississippi); Sixth (Kentucky); Seventh (Indiana); Eighth
(Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota); Ninth (Hawaii, Montana, Washington); Tenth
(Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Wyoming); Eleventh (Alabama, Florida,
Georgia).
65Id. at 10.
6 Id. at 12-13.
67 See id. at v, 11. The study concluded that the average
delay occasioned by invoking the certification process was approximately six months. See id. at 16. The
study also concluded that this delay was outweighed by the benefits of certification
mentioned above. See id. Further, this six-month period overstates the actual delay
caused by certification in that it fails to account for the time that would be required
by the federal court to research and answer the question certified to the state Supreme Court, which, due to the federal judiciary's relative lack of familiarity with
state law, could take longer for the federal judge than his state counterpart. See id. at
15-16. Finally, since an answer to a certified question represents a definitive statement of state law from the state's highest court, certification expedites the resolution
of other cases that may arise in either federal or state court that involve the same or
related questions of state law. See id. at 17.
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In 1988, Professors Corr and Robbins conducted a broaderbased empirical study of both federal and state judges and their respective experiences with the certification process."' Consistent with
the findings of the FJC study conducted five years earlier, the CorrRobbins survey reflected overwhelming support for the certification
process among both the federal and state judiciaries.6 9 The study
concluded:
The federal and state judges who responded to the survey generally indicated overwhelming judicial support for the certification
process. A large majority of the federal judges found the process
to be a convenient and appropriate method for ascertaining controlling state law. The state judges agreed that certification affords
the state courts their appropriate decisionmaking role. Although
both federal and state judges acknowledged the burden that certification may impose on litigants, the burden proved to be much
less important than commentators had initially anticipated and
simply did not outweigh the tangible benefits of certification. 70
In 1994, the American Judicature Society conducted a similar
empirical study that reached similar results.'

In particular, the study

noted that eighty percent of the state Supreme Court Justices surveyed stated that their courts were "willing" or "very willing" to answer certified questions posed to them by federal courts.72 Furthermore, eighty-eight percent of the state judges surveyed disagreed with
the proposition that answering certified questions from other courts
consumes an inordinate amount of their court's time.73 Finally,
eighty-three percent of circuit judges, sixty-seven percent of district
court judges, and seventy-six percent of state judges surveyed disagreed with the proposition that the delay and expense of certification
made it an impractical procedure for litigants. 4
In short, as the Corr-Robbins study concluded:
The problems associated with certification probably have been
overstated, while the promised benefits of the process in a federalSee Corr & Robbins, supra note 26. The study polled 66 state Supreme Court
justices, of whom 31 responded, and 64 federal judges, of whom 18 responded. See
id. at 445.
W In particular, the study indicated that a great majority of federal
and state
judges did not find that the delays and expenses associated with the certification
process made it an impractical procedure for the courts or litigants. See id. at 449,
456.
70 Id. at
457.
71 See Goldschmidt, supra
note 9.
72 See id.
at 46.
73 See id. at
74.
74 See id. at
67.
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state context has been substantially achieved in those cases in
which certification was tried.75
C.

Whither Certification: The New Jersey Supreme Court Considers
Whether to Adopt a CertificationProcedure

In addition to the cris du coeur from the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals and judges in the District Court of the District of New Jersey,76 the New Jersey Supreme Court has been urged to adopt a certification procedure on numerous occasions. In the Fourth Annual
Assessment (1995) of the Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction
Plan for the Implementation of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
adopted the Advisory Committee's recommendation that the New
Jersey Supreme Court be encouraged to adopt a certification procedure.77
Chief Judge Thompson transmitted this recommendation to
Chief Justice Wilentz as well as to his successor, Chief Justice Poritz.7 "
Subsequently, Chief Judge Thompson met with Chief Justice Poritz
and discussed the issue of certification. 9 In December of 1996 the
United States District Court adopted a resolution that urged the New
Jersey Supreme Court to establish a certification procedure by adoption of the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law [Act] [Rule]
(1995). o This resolution, together with a memorandum discussing
certification in some detail, was also transmitted to the New Jersey
Supreme Court. " In March of 1997, Chief Justice Poritz advised
ChiefJudge Thompson that, after review and discussion, the NewJer-

75 Corr & Robbins, supra note 26, at
457-58.
76 See sup-a text accompanying notes 49-62.
77 See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW
JERSEY, FOURTH
ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CVILJUSTICE EXPENSE & DELAY REDUCTION PLAN FOR THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, 28-29 (May 28, 1996)

[hereinafter Fourth Annual Assessment].
78

See UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY,

ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE

&

FIFTH

DELAY REDUCTION PLAN FOR THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, 31 (June 20, 1997)

[hereinafter Fifth Annual Assessment].
79 See id. at 32.

80 See id. The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws
"has promulgated the Uniform Act/Rule for certified questions in a form which can
be enacted by a legislature or adopted by a court as a rule. In some jurisdictions,
action by the highest court will suffice with no legislative action required." UNIF.

CERTIF. OF QUESTIONS OF LAW [ACT] [RULE] (1995), 12 U.L.A. 70 (1996).
81 See Fifth Annual Assessment, supra note 78,
at 32.
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sey Supreme Court had elected not to consider adoption of a certification procedure.82
In 1996, the Executive Committee of the State Bar Association
met with members of the New Jersey Supreme Court to urge the
Court to adopt a certification procedure."3 Shortly thereafter, the
Supreme Court Committee on Civil Practice provided the New Jersey
Supreme Court with recommendations as to whether the Court
should adopt a rule that would provide for a certification procedure.
The Subcommittee on Certification issued a Majority and a Minority Report84 on April 7, 1997. The Majority Report recommended
the adoption of a rule that would allow the New Jersey Supreme
Court to accept certified questions from federal circuit courts of appeals and the highest appellate courts of other states.85 The Minority
Report recommended against the adoption of a certification rule, citing to concerns that a certification rule would create undue delay
See id. The report noted: "Both the Court and the Advisory Committee regret
this decision. We trust that, in the future, the New Jersey Supreme Court will again
address this issue and provide a means by which questions may be certified to it." Id.
8s The NewJersey State Bar Association has
been lobbying for a statute adopting
a certification procedure. See MINORITY REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CERTIFICATION (citing Hulmes v. Honda Motor Co., 924 F. Supp. 673, 678 n.6. (D.N.J.
1996)).
82

84 See SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON CVIL PRACTICE, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW TO THE SUPREME COURT (Apr. 7, 1997)

(including the minority and majority reports of the subcommittee, [hereinafter
"Minority Report" and "Majority Report" respectively]).
85 See Majority Report, supra note 84. The subcommittee prepared
the following
draft on the basis of certain sections of the Uniform Certification of Questions of
Law [Act] [Rule] (1995). The proposed rule stated:
2:2-2A Answering Certified Questions of Law
(a) The Supreme Court may answer a question of law certified to it by
any appellate court of the United States, or by the highest court of another state, if the answer would be determinative of a pending litigation in the certifying court and New Jersey law on the issue is unsettled.
(b) The Supreme Court may reformulate a question of law certified to
it.

(c) A certification shall contain:
(i) The question or questions to be answered.
(ii) A statement of the facts relevant to the question.
(iii) The names and addresses of the counsel of record and of
parties appearing without counsel.
(d) The Supreme Court may require the certifying court to supply it
with the record of the matter certified, or a portion thereof.
(e) No papers, other than those described in subsections (c) and (d)
of this rule may be filed in connection with a certification, except by
leave of court.
(f) [Reserved]
Majority Report, supra note 84, at 13.
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and expense, needlessly burden the New Jersey Supreme Court, and
require the Court to issue advisory opinions inconsistent with its
normal appellate function.86 The main objection of the Minority Report, however, concerned the constitutional authority of the New Jersey Supreme Court to consider and answer questions of law certified
to it. 7

Although the Majority Report recommended approval of the
certification procedure, it stated that it shared the concern of the
Minority Report that certification may not be possible under New
Jersey's Constitution without amendment.8
The full committee,
which was evenly divided on the issue of providing for a certification
procedure, voted in favor of making no recommendation as to the
constitutionality of a certification procedure.
II.
The literature critical of certification echoes the concerns raised
by the Minority Report.89 Critics of interjurisdictional certification
point to:
" The potential for certification to cause unnecessary expense
and delay.9"
* The potential for certification to .clog state dockets with federal cases. 9'
See id. at 5-6.
See Minority Report, supra note 84, at 8. The Minority Report's constitutional
concerns, and responses thereto, are discussed in greater detail in Section II(B), infra.ss See
Majority Report, supra note 84, at 2-3
("All of the subcommittee members,
albeit to various degrees, have concerns about the constitutionality of such a Rule.").
89 See generally Mattis, supra note 26; Robertson, supra note 26; Yonover
I, supra
note 26; Yonover II, supra note 26. See also 43 A.L.I. PROC. at 371-88 (1966)
(transcript of debate before the American Law Institute regarding adoption of certification rule).
90
SeeYonover I, supra note 26, at 332-33 (noting that certification can delay cases
up to 15 months). Indeed, in the first United States Supreme Court case to utilize
interjurisdictional certification, Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960),
Justice Douglas dissented in part because certification would, in his view, condone a
"practice of making litigants travel a long, expensive road in order to obtain justice."
Id. at 227. Justice Douglas subsequently modified his position on certification when
he authored the Supreme Court's opinion in Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386
(1974), which strongly endorses the use of certification in diversity suits raising novel
issues of state law. See id. at 390-91.
91 See, e.g., Yonover I, supra note 26, at 318 ("Perhaps
the fact that such populous
states as California, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey have not yet adopted certification
procedures can be explained by the relatively large number of federal district court
filings and an unwillingness to add to already overburdened state supreme court
dockets."). Since the publication of the Yonover article, California has promulgated
86
87
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" The potential for certification to frustrate the salutary 9effects
2
of diversity jurisdiction on the development of state law.
" The argument that answers to certified questions constitute
advisory opinions," or that certified questions are too abstract
forjudicial resolution. 4
" State constitutional provisions that arguably restrict state Supreme Courts from exercising 'jurisdiction" over certified
questions."5
Neither these abstract concerns nor the specific objections identified
in the Minority Report pose insurmountable obstacles to the creation
of a certification procedure in NewJersey.
a rule providing for certification and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted a
certification procedure on a trial basis. See supra note 9.
92 See, e.g., Yonover I, supra note 26, at 334-42; cf. David
L. Shapiro, FederalDiversityJurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal,91 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1977). The supposed
benefits of federal adjudication of state law issues of first impression are discussed
infra, notes 123-40 and accompanying text.
9s See Corr & Robbins, supra note
26, at 419-22.
94
See id. at 422-24.
,5 See, e.g., Robbins, Proposalfor Reform, supra note 12, at 166-73 (discussing
New
York's constitutional provisions); Goldschmidt, supra note 9, at 93-99 (summarizing
case law regarding the constitutionality of various certification procedures under
state law and concluding, "[c]onstitutional challenges to the certification process
have centered around the jurisdiction of state high courts to hear a certified question and their judicial power to enact certification procedures."); Minority Report,
supra note 84, at 9 (discussing the constitutional limitations on New Jersey Supreme
Court jurisdiction); SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, INTERNAL MEMORANDUM,
ADOPTION OF A "CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE" 6 (April 9, 1997) (redacted version on
file with authors) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA MEMORANDUM] (discussing California constitutional restraints on the exercise of certification 'jurisdiction"). The constitutional issue, though it takes different forms depending on the state constitutional
provision in question, generally relates to whether the state constitution in question
provides the Supreme Court of the state with jurisdiction to entertain a certified
question. As discussed below, this Article argues that answering a certified question
does not constitute the exercise of original jurisdiction within the meaning of the
NewJersey Constitution. See infra note 168 and accompanying text; Bonner v. Oklahoma Rock Corp., 863 P.2d 1176 n.3 (Okla. 1993) (rejecting the constitutional argument in part because certification does not involve the exercise ofjurisdiction by
the answering court); see also Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1079-80
(Ohio 1991) (same). Even among those states that have perceived'a constitutional
issue precluding the adoption of a certification process, several, including New York,
have concluded that the benefits of interjurisdictional certification - viz., obtaining
a definitive answer to unsettled state law issues from the most authoritative source were great enough to warrant amending their respective constitutions. See Robbins,
Proposalfor Reform, supra note 12, at 166-70 (discussing New York's experience in enacting a certification procedure, including amendment of the New York Constitution); see also NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, MEMORANDUM RELATING TO
CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, A. 5453-65 [B], 208th

Sess., reprinted in 1985 N.Y. Laws 707-934 (recommending that New York amend its
constitution to provide for certification to avoid "federal invasion of the state law
making function" and resultant "federal-state friction").
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The Potentialfor Certificationto Cause UnwarrantedExpense,
Delay, and Inundation of the Supreme CourtDocket

The fear that allowing federal courts to certify questions of state
law to the state's highest court will cause delay, expense, and an explosion in the state court docket has failed to materialize in the states
that have adopted a certification procedure. There is little reason to
suspect New Jersey's experience would be any different. Therefore,
this concern should not pose a serious obstacle to adoption of a certification procedure in New Jersey. That this fear has failed to materialize is due to: (1) comity (federal judges have been circumspect and
cautious with respect to the use of the certification process), and (2)
discretion (the state's highest court maintains complete discretion to
accept or reject the certified question).
As an initial matter, there is no doubt that the certification
process creates an additional element of delay in the adjudication of
diversity cases in federal court.9' 6 The most comprehensive empirical
study of delay caused by certification is contained in the 1983 study
conducted by the FJC, which concluded that the median delay is approximately six months. 7
Several points might be made concerning this delay. First, the
six-month figure overstates the delay resulting from the certification
N Of course, this delay in itself creates disincentives for federal judges to abuse
the certification process. Federaijudges are no less concerned about docket control
than their state counterparts, and the prospect of adding an additional six months to
their disposition statistics while the certified question is being answered provides a
built-in mechanism to limit misuse of the certification process.
97 See SERON, supra note 35; see also Goldschmidt, supra note 9,
at 42 (noting that
circuit judges waited average of 6.6 months to receive answer and district judges
waited average of 8.2 months). Critics of certification have cited to longer delays,
see, e.g., Mattis, supra note 26 (reciting anecdotal evidence of a three-year delay
caused in part by certification proceedings in Green v. Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97 (5th
Cir. 1962)), but this evidence is unconvincing when compared to the empirical studies conducted by the Federal Judicial Center. The authors' own research provides
further confirmation that the delays associated with certification are not nearly as
dire as the rather stale predictions contained in the Mattis article. See Letter from
Debbie Causseaux, Chief Deputy Clerk, Florida Supreme Court, to the Hon. William
G. Bassler, U.S.D.J. (Jul. 20, 1998) (on file with the authors) ("The average time for
disposition from the date filed in this Court is ten-twelve months. Approximately
five to six months of this time is spent receiving briefs and scheduling oral argument."); see also Corr & Robbins, supra note 26, at 453 (surveying state Supreme
Court clerks who provided the following statistics regarding delay: Iowa (9-12
months); Maryland (6-9 months); Kansas, North Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin (3-6 months)).

See, e.g., NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, MEMORANDUM

A. 545365[B], 208th Sess., reprinted in 1985 N.Y. Laws 707-934, at 2584 ("[T]he Commission
would note that, based on recent correspondence with state courts that have certification statutes, delay has not been a problem.").
RELATING TO CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW TO THE COURT OF APPEALS,
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process itself; the time spent by the parties briefing the issues, and by
the Court in deciding them, would be duplicated were the issue to be
determined by the federal court sitting in diversity. 98 Second, obtaining a conclusive answer to an unsettled question of state law provides
broad benefits to future litigants and parties that seek to conform
their conduct to the rule of law. Not only does certification expedite
the resolution of other cases that may arise either in state or federal
court that raise the same issues of law,99 but it also results in the
elimination of transaction costs that inevitably result when citizens of
the state attempt to conform their conduct either to disparate rules
emanating from the state courts and federal courts '°° or to the nonprecedential opinion of a federal court.
Finally, if, as has been argued earlier in this Article,'0 ' obtaining
an answer concerning unsettled state law from the appropriate state
court is a desirable result, the only alternative to certification - abstention - results in considerably greater delay, expense, and inconvenience, and it is generally available only in a subset of cases - viz.,
those raising federal constitutional issues.0 ° The saga of Sally Frank,
a Princeton University student who sought judicial assistance in gaining admittance to Princeton University's (formerly) all-male eating
clubs, is illustrative of the delays associated with Pullman abstention.

98 See SERON, supra note 35, at 15-16. The Federal
Judicial Center staff paper explained:
Although the time required to obtain the state court answer, a median
of six months, is clearly a delay occasioned by the certification process,
that time must be set off against the time that would be required for
the federal court to research and reach its own answer to the question
certified to the state court.
Id.; see also Lillich & Mundy, supra note 16, at 909 ("[A]t least part of the time required for obtaining the state court decision would be necessary for the federal
court to make its own determination.").
9 See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055,
1075 (1997)
(suggesting that once a state Supreme Court adjudicates an issue certified to it, resolution of the issue in subsequent litigation "may indeed become greatly simplified");
see also Corr & Robbins, supra note 26, at 430 (arguing that "consistency in the law
and finality of state pronouncements that makes it unnecessary for future parties to
litigate the same issue" outweighs inconvenience of delay to litigants involved in particular case).
1oo See supra note 29 (discussing the development of parallel lines
of authority
emanating from federal and state courts purporting to govern same legal issue).
:01 See supra notes 28-31.
,02 See Arizonans for Official English, 117 S. Ct. at 1073 (stating that certification
provides benefits of state-court adjudication of novel state law issues without delay
concomitant to Pullman abstention); see also, e.g., Eichelberger, supra note 26, at
1341 (same); Lillich & Mundy, supra note 16, at 890 n.22 (same).
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Frank filed a complaint in December of 1979 with New Jersey's
Division on Civil Rights (the Division), alleging that the Ivy Club violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD).0 5 The Division initially held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the cause, but the
Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey reversed and
remanded to the Division for further factual findings and reconsideration of its jurisdictional determination.' °4 Seven years later, in
1986, the Division determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the case
and ruled that the LAD prohibited the eating clubs from excluding
women.0 5 Also in 1986, the club filed a federal lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that-application of the LAD would violate its First
Amendment associational rights. 0 6
Applying Pullman, the District Court stayed the federal action to
allow the state courts to determine whether the LAD applied to the
eating clubs.0 7 Meanwhile, the clubs pursued their state claims in the
state court and explicitly reserved their federal claims to litigate in
the stayed federal proceeding.' 8 On July 3, 1990, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Division's determination that it had jurisdiction and ordered the club to admit women.'09 On August 24,
1990, the club moved to reopen its federal action originally commenced in 1986. " 0 On October 15, 1990, the District Court certified
to the Third Circuit the question of whether the club had in fact
waived its right to litigate its federal claims by failing to raise them in
the parallel state action."' On August 21, 1991, twelve years and
three college careers after the litigation had been commenced, the
Third Circuit concluded that the federal claims had not been waived
and remanded the case to the District Court to determine the federal
issues." 12 The experience of other federal courts invoking Pullman
3
abstention corroborates the rather bleak experience of Frank."1
03

N.J.

STAT. ANN. §§

10:5-1 to -49 (West 1996); see also Ivy Club v. Edwards, 943

F.2d 270, 273 (3rd Cir. 1991).
:(" See Ivy Club, 943 F.2d. at 273-74.
05 See id.
at 274.
106 See id.
:07

See Tiger Inn v. Edwards, 636 F. Supp. 787, 792 (D.N.J. 1986).

108

See Ivy Club, 943 F.2d at 275.

9
"o

12

SeeFrankv. Ivy Club, 120 N.J. 73, 111,576 A.2d 241, 261 (1990).
See Ivy Club, 943 F.2d at 275.
See id.

See id. at 283-84.

In Instructional Systems, Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 35 F.3d 813 (3rd Cir.
1994), for example, the plaintiff initially filed in state court, from which the action
was removed in 1989. See id. at 816. The defendant argued that application of the
NewJersey Franchise Practices Act (NJFPA), N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 to -15 (West
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That the certification floodgates have not opened as feared'1 4
can also be attributed to the self-restraint exercised by the federal judiciary with respect to the certification process." 5 Unlike the typical
certiorari process, which is initiated by the litigants on motion to the
certiorari court, in the typical interjurisdictional certification process
questions of law are propounded by the certifying court."6 As the experience of the numerous state courts that have adopted certification
procedures has shown," 7 the federal judiciary has consistently heeded
the call to restraint raised by commentators and the case law and has,
in practice, certified questions sparingly."" Empirical studies provide
1989), to foreign corporations would violate the "dormant" Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. See InstructionalSystems, 35 F.3d. at 816-17. The District
Court abstained pursuant to the Pullman doctrine to allow the chancery division to
determine whether the NJFPA applied to out-of-state activities. See id. at 817. After
four years of litigation in the state courts, the state courts concluded that the NJFPA
applied to the conduct of the defendant. See id. at 817-18. The District Court then
resumed consideration of the case. See id. at 818. The case was ultimately appealed
to the Third Circuit, which, on September 16, 1994, determined that application of
the NJFPA to activities outside of New Jersey did not offend the United States Constitution. See id. at 828.
14
See Braun, supra note 12, at 942 ("One constraint on adoption of certification
procedures has been the fear of inundation. The concern is that if other jurisdictions are permitted to refer questions of state law to the state supreme court, they
will do so unreasonably often as a way of delegating or evading their own responsibilities.").
"5 See, e.g., Barnes v. Atlantic & Pac. Life Ins. Co., 514 F.2d 704, 705 n.4 (5th Cir.
1975) ("[Wle use much judgment, restraint and discretion in certifying. We do not
abdicate."), certifying question to 325 So. 2d 143 (Ala. 1975), conformed to answer, 530
F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1976); Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assoc., 70 F.3d 291, 303
(3rd Cir. 1995) (stating in response to suggestion that certification causes delay that
"this is an argument for exercising the authority wisely - not for denying it altogether").
116 See, e.g., UNIF. CERTIF. OF QUESTIONS OF LAW [Acr] [RuLE] (1995)

§

3, 12 U.L.A.

73 (1996) ("The [Supreme Court] of this State may answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States.") (emphasis added).
"7 See Letter from Debbie Causseaux, Chief Deputy Clerk, Florida Supreme
Court, to the Hon. William G. Bassler, U.S.D.J. (July 20, 1998) (on file with the
authors) (stating that Florida Supreme Court received one certified question from
Fifth Circuit federal courts in 1995 (.046% of filings), five in 1996 (.20% of filings),
and seven in 1997 (.24% of filings) with an approximate disposition time of 10 to 12
months from the date the certified question is filed with the Court); Letter from
Sherie M. Welch, Clerk of the Georgia Supreme Court, to the Hon. William G. Bassler, U.S.D.J. (July 30, 1998) (detailing the number of cases certified each calendar
year to Georgia Supreme Court by Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals: 1991 (5),
1992 (7), 1993 (3), 1994 (7), 1995 (3), 1996 (7), 1997 (7)); see also Braun, supra note
12, at 967 app. I (compiling statistics on certification questions for state courts within
the Ninth Circuit and indicating that from 1990-91, the average percentage of certifled questions as total of docket was .35%).
11
See, e.g., Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HARv. L. REV.
1358, 1368 (1960) (certification "should be used only in situations of genuine perplexity concerning state law; it must not become a substitute for conscientious and
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further evidence that the federal judiciary has, in practice, limited
certification to a subset of unsettled questions that may arise - those
that concern matters of importance to the state involved."9
The complete discretion vested in the state's highest court to accept or reject certified questions provides another means of defanging the docket control monster conjured by the critics of certification. In both the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act and
the draft certification rule forwarded to the New Jersey Supreme
Court by the Supreme Court Committee on Civil Practice, the state's
highest court retains the power to accept or reject a certified question." ° Indeed, the California Supreme Court, which recently
adopted a certification procedure, dismissed concerns that it would
lose control over its docket by citing to the unfettered discretion
the
2
Court would retain to decline to answer certified questions.1'
independent Uudicial] adjudication"); McKusick, supra note 12, at 39 (warning
against over-enthusiastic use of a certification procedure); see also Lehman Bros. v.
Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1973) ("[M]ere difficulty in ascertaining local law is no
excuse for remitting the parties to a state tribunal for the start of another lawsuit.");
Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 303-04 ("[A] federal court should be authorized to certify a
question of law to the state court when: (1) the issue is one of importance; (2) it
may be determinative of the litigation; and (3) state law does not provide controlling
precedent through which the federal court could resolve the issue."); Corr & Robbins, supra note 26, at 450 (noting that federal and state judges responding to the
survey listed the following four factors as having "great weight" in deciding whether
to certify a question: (1) whether question involved construction of new or previously unconstrued statute, (2) the closeness of state law question, (3) the strength of
the state court's interest in the legal issue, and (4) potential to avoid inconsistency
with later state court decisions). The judicious use of the certification procedure by
federal judges also stems from mechanisms built into the certification process that
deter its abuse. Courts of appeal, to which litigants may appeal as of right, see 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), normally carry a heavy docket. To avoid having cases linger
on the appellate docket, circuit judges naturally would hesitate to utilize the procedure except where important issues of state law are concerned.
119
See, e.g., Goldschmidt, supra note 9, at 44 (polling federal judges and finding
that certification is employed "sparingly," only when "important state court issues"
are involved, and upon a "convincing" demonstration that "the criteria for certification [have] been met").
120 See UNIF. CERTIF. OF QUESTIONS OF LAW [ACT] [RULE] (1995) § 3, 12 U.L.A. 73
(1996) ("The [Supreme Court] of this State may answer a question of law certified to
it by a court of the United States... ")(emphasis added); COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 11, at 13 app. 1, Draft Certification Rule 2:2-2A ("The Supreme Court may answer a question of law certified to it by any appellate court of the United States."); see
also UNIF. CERTIF. OF QUESTIONS OF LAW [AcT] [RULE] (1995) § 3 cmt., 12 U.L.A. 73
(1996) ("Ultimately, the receiving court retains the power to accept or reject a certified question so that it can control its docket."); Braun, supra note 12, at 945 (citing
discretion to deny certification as factor allaying docket control concerns).
12)

See CALIFORNIA

MEMORANDUM,

supra note 95 at 7-8. The memorandum stated:

I agree with the memos that the fears of some that this court would be
unduly burdened by requests for certification appear to be unfounded. Pursuant to section 2 of the proposed rule, only certain
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In light of the restraint exercised by the federal judiciary and the
relatively minuscule impact certification has had in fact on state
dockets, it is not surprising that ninety-five percent of United States
circuit judges, ninety percent of United States district judges, and
eighty-seven percent of state court judges were satisfied with the certification process in their respective jurisdictions. 22 Neither delay nor
loss of docket control should deter adoptiorT of a certification procedure in NewJersey.
B.

The PurportedBenefits of "Cross-Pollination"Should Not Prevent
Adoption of a CertificationProcedure

Several commentators have argued that certification would stymie the positive benefits supposedly flowing from federal court adjudication of novel issues of state law. According to this line of
thought, determination by a separate federal system "cross-pollinates"
the development of state law by "reconciling or distinguishing existent precedent [and] synthesizing and analyzing state law.'

123

Some

commentators also suggest that the absence of a certification procedure impacts positively on the development of state law because, in
their view, federal judges are simply more competent than state
12 4
judges, even in determining issues of state law.
As an initial matter, permitting federal courts to request a certified answer from the New Jersey Supreme Court would not necessarnamed courts - and not any party to any litigation - would be permitted to request certification. Pursuant to section 6 of the proposed rule,
we would retain our normal and broad 'rule 29 discretion' to deny requests for certification.
Id.

See Goldschmidt, supra note 9, at 15-17.
See Shapiro, supra note 92, at 326; see also William M. Landes & Richard
A.
Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction,9 J. LEGAL STUD.
367, 372, 386 (1980); Yonover I, supra note 26, at 340 ("When these federal courts
do 'anticipate,' their pronouncements of state law echo beyond the case at hand and
influence positively the course of state law development.").
124 See, e.g., Yonover I, supra note 26, at 336-37. Yonover
stated:
[I] nsofar as federal judges are perceived as having greater technical
competence and are more insulated from majoritarian pressures, they
have the freedom to render decisions, which may be socially and politically controversial, without fear of electoral reprisal. It has even
been suggested that some attorneys believe that "federal judges are
more familiar with the relevant substantive law," even when the issues
posed are ones of state substantive law.
Id. (quoting Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under
Diversity and Federal QuestionJurisdiction,41 AM. U. L. REv. 369, 434 (1992)). Needless to say, this is a view with which the authors, including the one having the most
pertinent experience (Judge Bassler has sat both as a federal judge and as a judge of
the Superior Court of NewJersey), strongly disagree.
1

123
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ily spell an end to "cross-pollination." As one commentator noted:
"Federal courts may continue to predict.
The Supreme Court may
25
decline certification even when asked.',

Furthermore, a federal court is by no means obliged to certify a
novel issue of state law even when one arises,2 6 and experience has
shown that federal judges tend to certify only those
unsettled ques. 127
tions that impact major policy concerns of the state.
Certification
procedures would allow for the New Jersey Supreme Court to control
the cross-pollination process by exercising its discretion to determine
which (if any) certified questions require answers. By identifying the
issues that require its attention, the New Jersey Supreme Court
would, in essence, extend its intra-state certification procedure to include important state law issues that, through the accident of diversityjurisdiction, arise in federal court.
The authors' objection to the cross-pollination argument has a
more substantive component as well. The dangers that inhere in
federal development of state law, in the authors' view, simply outweigh the putative benefits associated with "cross-pollination." First
and foremost, federal development of state law invades the sovereignty of the state whose law is being (mis)applied. As the Ohio Supreme Court stated in opining on the constitutionality of Ohio's certification procedure:
The state's sovereignty is unquestionably implicated when federal
courts construe state law. If the federal court errs, it applies law
other than Ohio law, in derogation of the state's right to prescribe a rule of decision. By allocating rights and duties incorrectly, the federal court both does an injustice to one or more
parties, and frustrates the state's policy that would have allocated
the rights and duties differently.
Second, while cross-pollination may sound attractive in the abstract, in reality, delegating authority to develop law simultaneously
to dual sovereigns results in confused and fragmented legal norms
that are befuddling to the citizens of the state obligated to obey
them. The potential for development of parallel federal-state lines of
authority in the absence of a certification procedure is fostered by
the federal rules that have developed for determining how the state's

Smetanka, supra note 12, at 738.
See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1975) ("We do not suggest
that where there is doubt as to local law and where the certification procedure is
available resort to it is obligatory.").
127 See supra text accompanying note 118.
s8 Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1080 (Ohio 1991).
125
16
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highest court would rule on a particular issue. Because the interpretative task facing the federal judge is to predict how the state's highest
court would decide the issue,'2 a federal court must pay deference to,
but is not bound by, the holdings of state intermediate appellate and
trial level courts.'3° Decisions of intermediate state appellate courts,
however, remain presumptive evidence of state law.1 3' Nevertheless,
the ability of federal judges to disagree with lower state courts when
attempting to predict how the highest court would rule can and does
lead to the development of parallel, but different, lines of authority
between the federal and state systems.132 This not only makes it more
difficult for citizens to determine the proper rule governing their
to choose
conduct, but also produces obvious incentives for litigants
13
the more favorable forum for their particular dispute. 3
Even if parallel lines of conflicting authority fail to develop in a
given instance, it is likely that the federal court's interpretation of
state law, while technically not constituting binding authority, will
serve defacto as the law of the state in the absence of an authoritative
state court pronouncement, if, that is, the issue ever wends its way to

See 19 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 4507 (2d ed. 1996) (instructing that in diversity actions, federal courts
must determine the issue as would the state's highest court).
,30See Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 113 (3rd Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1005 (1993); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Farrell, 855 F.2d 146, 148-49
(3rd Cir. 1988); McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 661 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980).
131 See Aetna, 855 F.2d at 148 ("serious consideration" may be given "to the opinion of an intermediate appellate court.").
132 See, e.g., Smetanka, supra note 12, at 731-35 (discussing
development of parallel lines of authority between Pennsylvania federal and state courts).
133 See, e.g., Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203,
1206 (3rd Cir. 1977)
("[A] diversity litigant should not be drawn to the federal forum by the prospect of a
more favorable outcome than he could expect in the state courts."), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 906 (1978)). One such example involving NewJersey law concerns the appropriate rule for damages for a bad faith refusal of an insurance claim. Compare Polito
v. Continental Cas. Co., 689 F.2d 457, 463 (3rd Cir. 1982) (permitting consequential
and punitive damages pursuant to breach of implied covenant of good faith theory)
with Garden State Community Hosp. v. Watson, 191 N.J. Super. 225, 227, 465 A.2d
1225, 1226 (App. Div. 1982) (declining to follow Polito and allowing no punitive
damages under New Jersey law for bad faith failure to pay insured's claim in timely
manner). A federal district judge in New Jersey in Wine Imports, Inc. v. Northbrook
Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 708 F. Supp. 105, 107-08 (D.N.J. 1989), subsequently declined to follow the Third Circuit's holding in Polito, finding Watson to be
controlling. Another federal court in Carfagno v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 770 F.
Supp. 245, 246 (D.N.J. 1991) followed Wine Imports. The matter became more complicated when a New Jersey appellate court rejected Wine Imports as a misreading of
Watson and subsequently adopted Polito's reasoning! See Pickett v. Lloyds, 252 N.J.
Super. 477, 485-86, 600 A.2d 148, 152-53 (App. Div. 1991).
129
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the state's highest court."' This result exists in considerable tension
with the teachings of Erie5' and essentially abdicates responsibility for
making important state policy to the federal judiciary, a body that
lacks the requisite sanction to produce an authoritative statement of
a separate sovereign's law. 6 As a matter of sound state policy, it is
perverse for federal judges, who, at least in the case of circuit judges,
may neither be residents of nor attorneys admitted to practice in New
Jersey, to determine important areas of New Jersey policy. Hakimoglu,3 7 for example, adopted a no-liability rule affecting one of New
Jersey's most important industries, casino gambling.' 8 Judge Alito of
the Third Circuit recently expressed misgivings about the propriety
of the federal judiciary ruling on areas of state policy when the Third
Circuit was compelled, because of the lack of a certification procedure in New Jersey, to opine on a New Jersey statute allocating financial responsibilities between the state and its subdivisions.'"
134 See Scott v. Bank One Trust Co.,
577 N.E.2d 1077, 1080 (Ohio 1991) ("The
frustration of the state's policy may have a more lasting effect, because other potential litigants are likely to behave as if the federal decision were the law of the state.").
135 It is not necessary in evaluating
the certification process to resolve the debate
as to whether Erie's holding depends on a commitment to legal positivism or instead
on the allocation of lawmaking particularly between federal and state courts emanating from considerations of institutional design and political theory. Compare LaBel,
supra note 26, at 1020 ("A state adopting a certification procedure, a federal court
employing the certification technique, and a state supreme court answering a certified question are all engaged in an enterprise that implicitly assumes that the legal
positivist tenet accurately states the nature of law.") with Jack Goldsmith & Steven
Walt, Erie and the Irrelevanceof Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REv. 673 (1998).
1
See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (basing holding that
federal court must apply state rule of decision in diversity cases on view that "law in
the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite
authority behind it" and rejecting as "fallac[ious]" the natural law view that there is a
"transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it
unless and until changed by statute"); NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION,

MEMORANDUM RELATING TO CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS, A. 5453-65[B], 208th Sess., reprinted in 1985 N.Y. Laws 707-934, at 2580

(citing Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 821 (2d Cir. 1973) (applying New York
common law principles to the application of Florida law), reversed, Lehman Bros. v.
Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1975) (rebuking the Second Circuit as "outsiders lacking the
common exposure to local law which comes from sitting in the jurisdiction") as an
example of the "federal invasion of the state law-making process").
137 See supra notes
50-56 and accompanying text.
138See NEWJERSEY CASINO CONTROL COMMISSION, CASINO GAMBLING IN NEWJERSEY:
A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACr STUDY COMMISSION (January 1998)
(reporting that the casino industry grossed $3.79 billion in 1997, employed 48,755 as
of November 17, 1997, with a total payroll of $1 billion, and generated $303.2 million in tax revenues in 1996); see also Knight v. Margate, 86 N.J. 374, 381, 431 A.2d
833, 836-37 (1981) (recognizing contribution of casino gaming to the tourist, resort,
recreational, and convention industry of the state).
139 See Michaels v. New Jersey,
150 F.3d 257, 259 (3rd Cir. 1998) Judge Alito la-
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That state courts should determine state law seems an irrefutable proposition, and the only one in keeping with the constitutionally
assigned responsibility of the NewJersey courts to promulgate rules
of decision to govern New Jersey's citizenry. Any perceived benefits
stemming from "cross-pollination" simply cannot trump the paramount interest of the state and its citizenry to have the appropriate
judicial entity define governing norms.141
C. Answers to Certified Questions Do Not Constitute Advisory
Opinions
Opponents of the certification procedure often argue that answering certified questions would run afoul of the general rule
against issuing advisory opinions. Related concerns have been expressed that certified answers will not be given res judicata effect.
These concerns should not prevent adoption of a certification procedure in NewJersey for several reasons:

mented:
The question presented by this appeal - involving the interpretation
of state statutes governing the allocation of certain financial responsibilities between the State and one of its subdivisions - is one that
seems to us to be particularly inappropriate for resolution by a federal
court .... However, because NewJersey does not permit certification,
we have no choice but to 'predict' how the state supreme court would
decide the question before us.
Id.
140
See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 1, para. 1 ("The judicial power shall be vested in a
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as from time to time may be established .... "). Both the United States Constitution, see Erie R.R v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, (1938), and the NewJersey Constitution assign the responsibility for developing state law on the state court. See N.J. CONST. art. VI. It is in keeping with the
concept of a functional judicial federalism that the state court system adjudicate
state law issues of first impression and thus avoid duplication of judicial effort. See
William G. Bassler, The Federalizationof Domestic Violence: An Exercise in CooperativeFederalism or a Misallocationof FederalJudicialResources, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 1139, 1185-86,
1190-91 (1996) (advocating that federal and state courts should be conceptualized as
a unitary system and adjudicatory responsibilities should be rationally assigned to
the best-suited court so as to avoid duplication of effort). Certification is particularly
appropriate to further a functional judicial federalism in light of the relative case
loads of federal courts of appeal on the one hand, see Bassler, supra, at 1152, and
those of the New Jersey Supreme Court on the other, see ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE COURTS, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, SUPREME COURT STATISTICS 1 (1998) (indicating
that from July 1, 1996 toJune 30, 1997, the NewJersey Supreme Court heard a total
of 132 appeals).
141 See LaBel, supra note 26, at 1040 ("[T]he source of a legal
rule is a matter of
critical importance in the identification of that rule as a rule of a particular system
and that the content of a particular rule may be more appropriately determined by a
judicial decisionmaker located within the system.").
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* The features of advisory opinions that make them objectionable as a matter of policy - their abstractness and their presentation outside the truth-seeking mechanism of the adversarial process - are not present in the certification procedure
proposed for New Jersey.
" The New Jersey Constitution, unlike Article III of the United
States Constitution, contains no "case or controversy" requirement, and does not prohibit courts, as a matter of constitutional law, from issuing advisory opinions. Moreover, the
policy concerns that have motivated the New Jersey Supreme
Court to decide cases even when the controversy underlying
the litigation is moot, 42 are equally persuasive reasons for an-

swering certified questions.
* Concerns that answers to certified questions will not have a
binding effect are unfounded and can be alleviated by careful
drafting of the certification rule and appropriate use of the
resultant process.
First, answering a certified question contains none of the evils
typically associated with rendering an advisory opinion. A normal
advisory opinion arises where the governor or legislature seeks an
opinion from the state's' highest court concerning a question of law
that arises independent from an adversarial process seeking to determine private rights.143 The "pure" advisory opinion, in the federal
system, is objectionable on two federal constitutional grounds: (1)
advising the legislative branch impermissibly encroaches on the legislative prerogative, and (2) rendering an advisory opinion runs afoul
of the Article III "case or controversy" requirement. 4 4 None of these
142

See, e.g., State v. Gartland, 149 N.J. 456, 464, 694 A.2d 564, 568 (1997); In re

Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 347, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (1987); see also infra notes 146-51 and
accompanying text (discussing Gartlandand Farrell).
1
See Levin, supra note 8, at 355-57.
144
U.S. CONSr. art. III, cl. 1; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968). The Flast
Court stated:
When the federal judicial power is invoked to pass upon the validity of
actions by the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government,
the rule against advisory opinions implements the separation of powers
prescribed by the Constitution ....

[T]he rule against advisory opin-

ions also recognizes that such suits 'are not pressed before the Court

with that clear concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing
conflicting and demanding interests.'
Id. (internal citation omitted); see also George N. Stevens, Advisory Opinions - Present
Status and an Evaluation, 34 WAsH. L. REv. 1, 13 (1959). Stevens suggested:
The procedural objections go to the lack of adequate argument, oral
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dangers are present in the certification procedure, however, for the
obvious reason that the certified question is litigated in an adversarial
posture. Since the certification procedure provides for filing of
briefs and oral argument 45 with the receiving court having a specific
question framed in a concrete factual setting, the proceeding bears
of the adversarial system and the purported benefits
the hallmarks
46
that follow.

Second, even accepting for the purposes of argument the analogy to advisory opinions, the New Jersey Constitution, unlike the
United States Constitution, does not contain a case or controversy
requirement and, therefore, would not erect any constitutional barrier to their adjudication by the state court. 47 The traditional reluctance to issue advisory opinions in New Jersey stems from prudential
and policy concerns, not constitutional ones.148 Indeed, the NewJerand written; burden on the judges, since they must do their own research in most instances; insufficient time to give the matter proper
consideration, because the legislative body or executive officer wants
an answer immediately; and the difficulties encountered in interpretation, because questions are presented in the abstract, rather than with
reference to particular facts. The principal philosophical objection
stems from the doctrine of separation of powers. The advisory opinion
practice does place in the judges a degree of control over legislative
and executive conduct, duties and obligations above and beyond the
judicial and does have serious implications on the operation of government under the doctrine of separation of powers.
Id. Since the federal constitutional prohibition is explicitly tied to the Article III
"case or controversy" requirement, it is not surprising that states whose constitutions
lack the "case or controversy" requirement freely permit advisory opinions. See, e.g.,
In re Opinion of the Justices, 179 A. 344 (N.H. 1935). Relatedly, appellate courts
from across the country regularly render a species of "advisory opinion" in certain
situations, such as when a case becomes moot during the pendency of an appeal.
See, e.g., In re Kiesha E., 859 P.2d 1290, 1294 n.5 (Cal. 1993); Dix v. Superior Court,
807 P.2d 1063, 1068 (Cal. 1991); In reElliott, 466 P.2d 347 (Wash. 1968). For examples of this practice in NewJersey, see infra text accompanying notes 147-50.
145 See, e.g., FLA. R. APP. P. 4.61 (containing provisions for briefs and oral
argument related to certified question).
146
See Eichelberger, supra note 26.
147
Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, cl. I with N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 1, para. 1. See
State v. Gartland, 149 N.J. 456, 464, 694 A.2d 564, 568 (1997) ("Unlike the federal
constitution, the NewJersey Constitution does not confine the exercise of the judicial power to actual cases and controversies."); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 34, 355 A.2d
647, 660 (1976) ("[N]o express constitutional language limits judicial activity to
cases and controversies."). The Majority Report is simply mistaken therefore when it
concludes that "the Court has historically indicated that it is constitutionally forbidden from issuing advisory opinions." Majority Report, supranote 84, at 3.
148 See Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 254 N.J. Super. 530, 537, 604 A.2d 126, 129 (App.
Div. 1992) (recognizing "the wholesome policy considerations which confine courts
to actual controversies and dissuade them from rendering abstract or advisory opinions") (emphasis added and citations omitted); see also Grand Union Co. v. Sills, 43
N.J. 390, 409, 204 A.2d 853, 863) (1964) (identifying policy of avoiding decision of
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sey Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to the general rule
limiting judicial consideration to live controversies. In State v. Gart49
land,1
for example, the wife of an abusive husband was convicted of
reckless manslaughter for killing her husband during an abusive episode. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to opine
on the statutory duty to retreat before resorting to deadly force, but
before it could render a decision, the defendant died.150 The Court
iterated its general policy against advisory opinions, but considered
the appeal anyway.151
The New Jersey Supreme Court's reasons for doing so are instructive and have resonance in the certification context. The Court
reasoned that the appeal raised issues of great importance to the
state that were "worth the judicial effort" to decide, even though the
controversy was not justiciable within the contours of the federal case
or controversy requirement.'52 The same policies counsel in favor of
utilizing a certification procedure. Because the certification procedure would be limited to those cases that both the federal court and
the New Jersey Supreme Court itself have identified as raising issues
of significant enough concern to warrant the attention of the highest
court in the state, answering certified questions would also be "worth
the judicial effort" and would enable the New Jersey Supreme Court
to define and decide issues of importance to the state.
Concerns that the New Jersey Supreme Court's answer would
not be followed by the certifying court should not deter adoption of
a certification rule for two reasons. First, a certification rule could be
drafted to require explicitly that the parties will be bound by the New
53
Jersey Supreme Court's determination of the certified question.
abstract issues as impetus for rule against issuance of advisory opinions).
:4
149 N.J. 456, 694 A.2d 564 (1997).
5o See id. at 460, 694 A.2d at 566.
151
See id. at 466, 694 A.2d at 569.

See id. at 465-66, 694 A.2d at 568-69; see also State v. Cannon, 128 N.J. 546, 54950, 608 A.2d 341, 343 (1992) ("[S]ince [the defendant] has now successfully completed the Program and has served, in the aggregate, more real time than called for
under her original sentence ...the outcome of our decision will have no practical
impact on defendant. The issues are of great importance, however, and should be
disposed of."); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 347, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (1987) (rendering
decision on merits in right to die case even though appellant died during pendency
of appeal: "Because of the extreme importance of the issue and the inevitability of
cases like this one arising in the future, we agree to render a decision on the mer152

its") (citations omitted).
153 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA MEMORANDUM, supra note 95
at 8. The memorandum
noted:
The vast majority of out-of-state authority holds that a state high
court's opinion answering a certified question is not an impermissible
advisory opinion so long as: (i) the court addresses only issues that are
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The authors, however, do not believe such language in the certification rule is necessary, because the customary language contained in
the uniform act and the versions adopted by various states - which
require a statement of the facts necessary to answer the question and
allow the answer to be determinative of an issue in the case - sufficiently safeguard against the dangers associated with advisory opinions.5 Second, as a practical matter and even without specific language in the certification rule as to the res judicata effect of the
certified answer, federal judges are not likely, after expending the effort to prepare a certification request and compile a record to transmit to the New Jersey Supreme Court, to disregard the answer provided.15 5 Indeed, a substantial body of federal case law has developed
confirming the resjudicata effect of certified answers.
truly contested by the parties; (ii) the court addresses only issues that are
presented on a fully developed factual record; and (iii) the court's opinion
on the certified question may be dispositive of the cause (and will be resjudicata between the parties.
Id. In this regard, the certification rule adopted by California requires a statement
by the certifying court that "the answer provided by the California Supreme Court
will be followed by the certifying court." CAL. R. CT. 29.5(b)(4). New Jersey could
allay fears that a decision would not be resjudicata by including similar language in
its certification rule.
154 See, e.g., Schleiter v. Carlos, 775 P.2d 709, 710 (N.M. 1989) (suggesting
that the
rule effectively avoids rendering advisory opinions by providing that a certification
request set forth "either a statement by the certifying court of the facts relevant to
the question certified, showing the nature of the controversy in which the questions
arose, or a stipulation of such facts by the parties, which has been approved by the
certifying court").
155See Goldschmidt, supra note 9, at 68 (noting that a strong majority
of circuit
and district judges agree that answers to certified questions should have the same
issue and claim preclusive effect as other decisions); see also Sunshine Mining Co. v.
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 1144, 1148 n.7 (Idaho 1983) ("Certification would
be a pointless exercise unless the state court's answers are regarded as an authoritative and binding statement of state law." (citing authorities)).
156 See Grover v. Eli Lilly and Co., 33 F.3d 716, 719 (6th
Cir. 1994) ("Having represented to the Ohio Supreme Court that its answer would be dispositive of the case,
the district court was bound to follow state law as declared in the answer."). In Sifers
v. General Marine Catering Co., 892 F.2d 386, 391-92 (5th Cir. 1990), the court held:
[W]e consider the state court's answer [to a certified question] to be
binding in the proceedings between the parties to the certified
case .... Ordinarily, a state court's answer to a certified question is final and binding upon the parties between whom the issue arose. Such
an answer, therefore, generally is the "law of the case" in any further
federal court proceeding involving those parties .... Further, because
we consider the state court's answer to be binding in the proceedings
between the parties to the certified case, that answer is now the law of
this circuit. For that reason it is binding as well upon those parties in
this appeal who were not parties to the certified case.
Id.; see also Tarr v. Manchester Ins. Corp., 544 F.2d 14, 14 (1st Cir. 1976) (declining
the parties' invitation to "correct" the answer received from the state Supreme Court
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Most states have found a way to accommodate their aversion to
advisory opinions within their certification procedure. 57 As Corr and
Robbins noted, "The clear preponderance of opinion that. answers
to the objection can be found ...suggests that concerns about rendering advisory opinions will not be a significant barrier to certification in the future.' 58 The absence of any constitutional barrier, as
well as the practical reality that federal courts are not likely to certify
questions of law only to disregard the answer they receive, rebuts
concerns that certification invokes the evils of adjudicating advisory
opinions.
D. Abstractness Concerns Should Not Prevent Adoption of a
CertificationProcedure
One of the major reservations concerning certification identified in the Minority Report is "whether the record of a case would be
sufficiently developed before a question of law raised in that case
would be certified to the Supreme Court of New Jersey."'5 9 Similarly,
concerns have been raised that factual disputes in the case give rise to
a record devoid of the factual concreteness necessary to render an
opinion.' 60
to the certified question: "No matter what the result [to the certified question], we
cannot 'correct' a state court's interpretation of its own law."); National Educ. Assoc.
v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 467 F.2d 447, 450 (5th Cir. 1972) (determination of the
state Supreme Court on a certified question "must necessarily be conclusive.., a
Federal court does not second-guess a State's application of its own law");
Thompson v. Ramirez, 597 F. Supp. 730, 732 (D.P.R. 1984) ("It has been unquestionably held that an opinion of a state Supreme Court issued in response to a question certified by a federal court, is final and binding on the parties as to the issue of
state law, to be given full resjudicata effect by the federal court.").
157 See, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co.,
611 P.2d 149, 151 (Kan. 1980)
(concluding that a certified question "arises from an actual case and controversy and
although presented as a question of law, it neither violates the case or controversy
requirement nor the separation of powers doctrine on advisory opinions"); see also
Wolner v. Mahaska Indus., Inc., 325 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Minn. 1982) (rejecting the argument that answers to certified questions are advisory opinions and holding that
certified answers represent "a pronouncement of law with the same effect as our
pronouncements of law in cases arising in the courts of this state").
15 Corr & Robbins, supra note
26, at 422.
159 Majority Report, supra note 84, at 3. The Majority Report concluded
that such
concerns should not deter adoption of a certification procedure, as long as only federal appellate courts, as opposed to district courts, have the power to request certification. See id. ("The Subcommittee felt that such dangers would be minimized by
limiting certification to cases referred to the Supreme Court by appellate courts.")
(emphasis in original). The issue of whether both district and appellate courts
should be able to request a certified answer is discussed infra in Section III of this
Article.
160 See, e.g., Schlieter v. Carlos, 775 P.2d 709, 712 (N.M.
1989) (declining to answer a certified question because of unresolved factual issues).
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Abstractness focuses on the concern that questions certified by
federal courts would compel the state courts to give an "academic answer... which is void of any factual surroundings."''
The proposed
certification rule, like the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law
Act, contains several procedural provisions that effectively safeguard
against the abstractness problem. Under the proposed rule, the New
Jersey Supreme Court would: (1) require a statement of the facts
relevant to the question; 62 (2) require the certifying court to supply
the Supreme Court of New Jersey with the record, or any portion of
it;63 (3) allow the New Jersey Supreme Court to reformulate the
question posed to it;' and (4) vest the Supreme Court of New Jersey
with discretion to decline to answer a question for any reason, including its determination that the case is not presented with the requisite
65
degree of factual clarity.1

As it is with the issue of advisory opinions, commentators have
noted that this objection has not proved to be a serious problem in
actual practice.'6 The commentators' views have been corroborated
by the empirical studies of the issue.6 7 Abstractness concerns, therefore, should not pose an obstacle to the adoption of a certification
procedure.

:6,
162

Kaplan, supra note 26, at 431.
See Proposed Certification Rule § 2:2-2A(c) (ii) (quoted in full supra note 85).

The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act similarly resolves this problem by
requiring that the certification order set forth "a statement of all facts relevant to the
questions certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which the
question arose."
163 See id. § 2:2-2A(d).
64 See id. § 2:2-2A(b).
65 See id. § 2:2-2A(a).
16 See Eichelberger, supra note 26, at 1354 n.92 (citing
Kaplan, supra note 26, at
431; Lillich & Mundy, supra note 16, at 900; Levin, supra note 8, at 351 n.54); see also
Scanelli, supra note 26, at 636-38. The author asserted:
The problems of abstractness and advisory opinions have become even
more unconvincing in light of the strict requirements of most certification procedures. These procedures generally require that the contents
of the certification order contain a statement of all facts relevant to the
questions certified and fully show the nature of the controversy in
which the question arose.
Scanelli, supra note 26, at 637.
167 See Goldschmidt, supra note 9, at 42. 78% of circuit
judges and 99% of district
judges felt that a final statement of facts accompanying certified question was adequate to decide the issue. See id. Most circuit (91%), district (81%), and state court
(64%) judges disagree with the statement that certification "impermissibly limits the
answering court's ability to consider the totality of the facts of a case." Id. at 68 The
vast majority of state and federal judges disagree with the proposition that courts
should decide entire cases, not isolated legal issues. See id. at 69.
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E. Answering a Certified Question Does Not Constitutethe Exercise of
OiginalJurisdiction,and is Therefore Not Forbidden by the New
Jersey Constitution
The chief objection to the certification process in New Jersey is
the view that answering a certified question would contravene the
limited grant of original jurisdiction to the New Jersey Supreme
Court by the New Jersey Constitution."" This concern is misplaced.
Certification is a sui generis process that does not constitute the exercise of original jurisdiction because, quite simply, the referring
court never cedes control of the reins of judicial power - viz., the
authority to enter judgment and grant relief to the parties before the
court. Other characteristics of the judicial process in general and the
certification procedure more specifically to which certification's opponents have ascribed jurisdictional significance, such as the stare
decisis effect of the answer to the certified question, are the product
of judge-made rules and lack jurisdictional significance. The constitutional limitations on the New Jersey Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, therefore, do not preclude the Court from answering a
question certified to it from the federal courts. Further, the NewJersey Constitution affirmatively grants the New Jersey Supreme Court
power to formulate rules to govern practice and procedure and the
administration of justice, a provision sufficiently broad to encompass
the authority both to promulgate a certification rule and to answer
certified questions. For these reasons, this section will argue that the
constitutional concerns raised by the New Jersey Committee on Civil
Practice should not bar adoption of a certification rule.
1 See Minority Report, supra note 84, at 8 ("The minority of the subcommittee
believes that constitutional problems raised by the proposed certification remedy are
too serious and the benefits of the procedure too insignificant to justify the Committee in recommending any change."). Although the Majority Report recommended
approval of the certification procedure, it stated that it shared the concern of the
Minority Report that certification may not be possible under New Jersey's Constitution without a constitutional amendment and that it would not recommend adopting a certification procedure if the NewJersey Supreme Court ultimately determines
that a constitutional amendment would be required. See Majority Report, supra note
84, at 3 ("If a constitutional amendment is indeed required to establish a certification process, the Subcommittee unanimously disfavors the pursuit of such an
amendment. This issue is not of such importance to warrant such a major undertaking.") (emphasis in original). Notably, however, other states have reached the opposite conclusion about the relative importance of certification and have amended
their constitutions to provide explicitly for the ability of their highest courts to consider questions of law certified to them by other sovereign courts. See NEwYORK LAW
REVISION COMMISSION, MEMORANDUM RELATING TO CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF
LAW TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, A. 5453-65[B], 208th Sess., reprinted in 1985 N.Y. Laws

707-934, at 2585-89 (concluding that an amendment to the New York Constitution
was warranted in light of the friction caused by federal courts making state law).
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1. Summary of Pertinent NewJersey Constitutional
Provisions
The New Jersey Constitution divides the subject matter jurisdiction of the NewJersey Supreme Court into two broad categories: appellate and original jurisdiction. Appellate jurisdiction is provided in
Article VI, which states in pertinent part:
The Supreme Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction in the last
resort in all causes provided in this Constitution.... Appeals may
be taken to the Supreme Court:
(a)
In causes determined by the Appellate Division of the
Superior Court involving a question arising under the Constitution of the United States or this State;
(b) In causes where there is a dissent in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court;
(c)

In capital causes;

(d) On certification by the Supreme Court to the Superior
Court and, where provided by the rules of the Supreme Court, to
the county courts and the inferior courts; and
(e)

In such causes as may be provided by law.'&)

The NewJersey Constitution also provides for the exercise of original
jurisdiction in limited circumstances:
The Supreme Court and the Appellate Division of the Superior
Court may exercise such original jurisdiction as may be
7 necessary
to the complete determination of any cause or review.1 0
Finally, the New Jersey Constitution grants the New Jersey Supreme
Court 'jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and the

discipline of persons admitted."'
In addition to thus defining the New Jersey Supreme Court's
original and appellate jurisdiction, the New Jersey Constitution contains a broad grant of rulemaking authority to the Court. Article VI,

SN.J. CONST. art. VI, § II, para.2 & § V, para. 1.
Id. § V, para. 3.

70

171 Id. § II, para. 3; see also In re LiVolsi, 85 N.J. 576, 584, 428 A.2d
1268, 1271-72
(1981) (discussing original jurisdiction over the discipline of attorneys admitted to

practice in New Jersey). Though the constitutional grant speaks only to the admission and discipline of New Jersey lawyers, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that it had jurisdiction pursuant to section II, paragraph 3 to determine the
constitutionality of the mandatory fee arbitration rule it had promulgated. See id.
No other provision in the constitution grants power to the New Jersey Supreme
Court other than article VI, section VI, paragraph 3, providing for the power to
commence disciplinary proceedings against a sitting judge or justice by certifying his
incapacity to the governor.
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section II, paragraph 3 provides the rulemaking and administrative
jurisdiction of the Court and reads:
The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice
and procedure in all such courts.1
2.

Views of Other State Courts

The remainder of this section will discuss the possible sources of
constitutional support for the adoption of a certification rule identified above: (1) the grant of original jurisdiction to the New Jersey
Supreme Court, and (2) the grant of rulemaking power to the New
Jersey Supreme Court. To place these issues in a larger jurisprudential context, however, this Article will first discuss the responses of
other states' highest courts addressing the constitutional issue.
Whether certification can be put into place by a rule of court or
by legislative enactment is of course not a question that is unique to
New Jersey. The question has been asked in other jurisdictions and
received varying answers depending, as one might expect, on the
language of the particular constitution in question and the jurisprudential views of the court providing the answer. While these variations distinguish the experiences of other states to some degree, the
threshold constitutional issue in New Jersey - whether answering a
certified question constitutes the exercise of original jurisdiction has been addressed by other state Supreme Courts and their views
therefore serve
to illuminate the same issue under the New Jersey
173
Constitution.
Most state high courts to consider the issue found that they have
constitutional authority to answer certified questions. They have advanced two chief rationales for recognizing this authority: (1) the
state Supreme Court's inherent judicial power to determine the
course of state law, and (2) a jurisdictional grant beyond the explicit
grants of original and appellate jurisdiction contained in the state
constitutions.

172

N.J. CONST. art. VI, § II, para. 3; see also Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 244-

45, 74 A.2d 406, 408-09 (1950) (discussing the rulemaking authority of the New Jersey Supreme Court).
173 See WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACIICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 6, § 4248 at 16870; see also Braun, supra note 12, at 968-81 (1996) (discussing constitutional provisions of other states with certification procedures and urging California to adopt the
same).
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Inherent Power

The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the "court needs no
explicit grant of jurisdiction to answer certified questions from the
federal court; such power comes from the United States Constitution's grant of state sovereignty."'7
The Ohio Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion:
In our view, such a power exists by virtue of Ohio's very existence
as a state in our federal system. We begin with a truism: the Ohio
Constitution permits the state to exercise its own sovereignty as
far as the United States Constitution and laws permit. Since federal law recognizes Ohio's sovereignty by making Ohio law applicable in federal courts, the state has the power to exercise and the
responsibility to protect that sovereignty. Therefore, if answering
certified questions serves to further the state's interests and preserve the state's sovereignty, the appropriate branch of state
75 government

-

this court -

may constitutionally answer them.'

The Washington and Idaho Supreme Courts have also found
that their state constitutions gave them inherent power to answer certified questions without a specific constitutional provision authorizing the process. 7 6 The Montana Supreme Court simply announced
that it had the authority to answer
certified questions, without dis1 77
cussing the basis for its decision.
b. Jurisdictional Grant from Legislature in Addition to
Explicit Constitutional Grant
The Florida and Washington Supreme Courts have held that, in
the absence of an explicit constitutional jurisdictional grant, residual
jurisdictional grants ofjudicial power to entertain certified questions
can be assigned to the state's highest court by the state legislature
without offending any constitutional principles.
The first state court to opine on the constitutionality of considering certified questions was the Florida Supreme Court, which
Shebster v. Triple Crown Insurers, 826 P.2d 603, 606 n.14 (Okla. 1992).
v. Bank One Trust Company, 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1079-80 (Ohio 1991).
176 See In re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347, 358 (Wash.
1968) ("It is within the inherent
power of the court as the judicial body authorized by the constitution to render decisions respecting the law of this state."); Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins.
Co., 666 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Idaho 1983) ("We hold that this Court has inherent power
to render decisions regarding Idaho law.").
174

175Scott

See Irion v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 461 P.2d 199, 202-03 (Mont. 1969); see also
supra note 6, § 4248 at 168-70. For a
more detailed discussion of the constitutional provisions of other states with a comparison to the California Constitution, see Braun, supranote 12, at 968-81.
177

WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
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raised the issue sua sponte in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Clay.78 Florida's certification rule was promulgated by the Florida Supreme
Court, in the exercise of its rulemaking power,7 9 and was also authorized pursuant to a statutory grant from the Florida Legislature.'8
The Clay Court first considered whether it had constitutional power
to promulgate its certification rule and concluded that such power
emanated from the grant of rulemaking authority in the Florida
Constitution: "[Adoption of a certification rule] was a valid exercise
of our organic power and provided a procedure for assisting, in a
spirit of comity, the Federal Appellate system in questions of state jurisprudence, no other forum for so doing having been established by
the laws of Florida." 8'
The Court next addressed what it considered the separate constitutional issue - viz.,
whether Section 4 of Revised Article V of our Constitution,
adopted in 1956, which delineates the appellate jurisdiction of
this court and provides for the issuance by it of named writs,
should be construed as prohibiting this court from exercising any
judicial powers other than those expressly provided for merei.
The Court concluded that exercising the judicial powers associated
with certification would offend no constitutional principle. First, unlike the United States Constitution which, because it defines legislative prerogative in a government of limited, express powers, the Florida Constitution acted as a limitation, rather than a grant, of
legislative power. As a consequence, the Florida Legislature, as agent
of the people, retained all residual sovereign power, including judicial power, and could delegate it to the Florida Supreme Court if it so
chose.8 3 The Court next reasoned:
With respect to legislation involving the judicial power inherent
in the state, it has been many times held by this court that, while
the Legislature cannot restrict or take away jurisdiction conferred
by the constitution, constitutional jurisdiction "can be enlarged by
133 So. 2d 735, 739 (Fla. 1961) ("At the risk of unduly lengthening this opinion, we deem it appropriate to note that we have also considered, sua sponte, the
question of our jurisdiction constitutionally to entertain the subject proceeding under the authority to do so contained in [Florida's certification rule].").
IT, See id. at 740 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3 ("The practice and procedure in
all courts shall be governed by rules adopted by the supreme court.")).
180See id. at 739 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 1997) ("The supreme
court of this state may, by rule of court, provide [for a certification procedure].").
178

181 Id. at 741.
182

Id.

See Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 742 (Fla. 1961) ("[A]lI power
not limited by a state constitution inheres in the people of that state.").
ts
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the legislature in all cases where such enlargement does not result
in a diminution of the constitutional power of some other court,
or where
such enlargement is not forbidden by the constitu8 4
tion.',

The Court concluded that answering certified questions would not
offend the Florida Constitution:
We have concluded that, in the absence of a constitutional provision expressly or by necessary implication limiting the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court to those matters expressly conferred upon
it, and in the absence of a constitutional provision expressly conferring upon another court jurisdiction to exercise the judicial
power which is the subject matter of § 25.031 and Rule 4.61, and
in the light of the well settled rule that all sovereign power, including the judicial power, not limited by a state constitution inheres to the people of the state, such power may be granted to
this court by statute if it is deemed to be a substantive matter, or
by a rule of this court if it is deemed to be a matter of "practice
and procedure."8 5

The Washington Supreme Court adopted the same reasoning
seven years later in In re Elliott' 86 "This court has recognized that the
legislature can confer jurisdiction on the courts or provide for statu184
85

Id. (quoting Chapman v. Reddick, 25 So. 673, 677 (Fla. 1899)).

Id. at 743 (internal quotations omitted). Significantly, the Florida Supreme

Court distinguished an earlier Florida Supreme Court case, City of Dunedin v. Bense,
90 So. 2d 300, 302 (1956), which declared unconstitutional a statute that purported
to confer original jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction - a writ not listed among
those that the Florida Constitution expressly enumerated. The Clay opinion first
quotes the Bense opinion at length:
U]urisdiction of the Supreme Court is conferred by the Constitution
itself. It is not endowed with any common-law prerogative outside of
the boundaries established by organic law. Certainly, the appellate jurisdiction is clearly defined. Its original jurisdiction is stated with equal
clarity.
The ancillary constitutional writs referred to as those
"necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction" are
writs which are incidental to the jurisdiction, either appellate or original, otherwise delineated by the Constitution.
Clay, 133 So. 2d at 742 (quoting Bense, 90 So. 2d at 302). The Clay Court distinguished Bense on the grounds that certification, to the extent it could be considered
jurisdictional, was not an exercise of original jurisdiction and therefore did not encroach upon the constitutional jurisdiction of another court, see id. at 742-43
(noting "absence of a constitutional provision expressly conferring upon another
court jurisdiction to exercise the judicial power which is the subject matter of
§ 25.031"), or expand the expressly enumerated powers of the Florida Supreme
Court. See id. at 741. In light of this, the Clay Court concluded that, because the
Florida Constitution simply never assigned the judicial power to answer a certified
question, it could be assigned as an incident of sovereignty retained by the people of
Florida. See id. at 743.
I86 446 P.2d 347 (Wash. 1968).
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tory procedures for the exercise ofjurisdiction
by the court, provided
187
the court exercises only judicial power.

Having concluded, as did the Florida Supreme Court, that the
power to entertain certified questions could be conferred by the Legislature consistent with the Washington Constitution, the Washington
Supreme Court upheld the statute providing for a certification procedure.' a8
c.

States that Have Held that Certification is not a
Jurisdictional Act

The Ohio and Oklahoma Supreme Courts concluded that a
Court does not exercise jurisdiction by answering a certified question
and that, therefore, any jurisdictional provisions in their respective
constitutions were irrelevant to the source of their authority to proclaim state law pursuant to the certification mechanism.
The Ohio Supreme Court addressed this issue in Scott v. Bank
One Trust Co.'" A federal district court in Ohio included as one of its
certified questions whether the certification rule was constitutional
under the provision of the Ohio Constitution defining the Ohio Supreme Court's jurisdiction.'90 The Ohio Supreme Court first noted
that, unlike the situation in Florida and Washington, "neither statute
nor rule of court can expand our jurisdiction beyond the constitutional grant."'9' The Court nevertheless concluded that it had the
authority to entertain and answer the questions certified to it:
WJurisdictional analysis is irrelevant to Rule XVI's constitutionality, for a court does not exercise jurisdiction by answering a certified question. "Jurisdiction" means "[t]he power to hear and determine a cause ....
" Sheldon's Lessee v. Newton (1854), 3 Ohio St.

494, 499. By answering a state law question certified by a federal
court, we may affect the outcome of the federal litigation, but the
federal court still hears and decides the cause. Therefore, answering a certified question is not an exercise ofjurisdiction.'9

187

Id. at 351 (citing Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, (Fla. 1961), for

this roposition).
UP See id. at 358.
189 577 N.E.2d 1077
(Ohio 1991).
19 See id. at 1079.
191 Id.
1
Id. The Ohio Supreme Court went on to hold that the judicial power to answer the question flowed not from its constitutional jurisdictional grant, but rather
from the state's sovereign existence in a federal system. See id. at 1079-80; supra text

accompanying note 175.
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court reached the same conclusion, for essentially the same reasons, in Bonner v. Oklahoma Rock Corp.: 9
This court needs no explicit grant ofjurisdiction to answer certified questions from a federal court, such power comes from the
United States Constitution's grant of state sovereignty. By answering a state-law question certified by a federal court, we may affect
the outcome of federal litigation, but it is the federal court who
hears and decides the cause.194
d.

States that Have Required a Constitutional
Amendment

While the majority of state high courts to have considered the issue have concluded that certification is proper under their constitutions, certification procedures have required constitutional amendments in a number of states. In Holden v. NL Industries,95 the Utah
Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional its court rule providing for certification. It determined that the certification rule did not
fall within the Utah Constitution's grant of original jurisdiction,
which is limited to issuance of writs such as mandamus and certiorari. 116 The Court further noted that the Utah Constitution's conferral of appellate jurisdiction, which provides: "In other cases the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only," was not capable
of an interpretation providing for the enlargement of the Utah Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 7 Finally, the Utah Supreme
Court noted that because federal courts are not "inferior courts" in
Utah's judicial system, the court's answer to a certified question in a
case to be adjudicated in a federal court is not an exercise of
"appellate jurisdiction" within the meaning of the Utah Constitution. 198

The Missouri Supreme Court, in an unpublished opinion, held
that notwithstanding a statutory provision authorizing certification,
the Missouri Constitution did not expressly or impliedly grant the
Court original jurisdiction to render opinions on questions certified

193
194

1992).

863 P.2d 1176, 1178 n.3 (Okla. 1993).
Id. at 1178 n.3; see also Shebester v. Triple Crown Insurers, 826 P.2d 603 (Okla.

629 P.2d 428 (Utah 1981).
See id. at 430.
197 Id.
198
See id. at 431. The Utah Constitution has since been amended and now explicitly authorizes the Utah Supreme Court to accept certified questions from federal
courts. SeeUTAH CODEANN. § 78-2-2 (1995) and UTAH R. APP. P. 41.
195
1'9
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by federal courts. The Supreme Court of Missouri also held that the
Legislature could not expand the scope of the court's jurisdiction.'"
A New York law revision committee similarly concluded that an
amendment to the New York Constitution would be necessary to implement a certification procedure. The Commission noted:
Unlike other states, where their state constitutions are not
deemed to preclude the legislature from conferring additional jurisdictional power upon their appellate courts ... [in New York]
the powers of the Court of Appeals stem from the Constitution of
the State. The court does not have, nor can it be invested with,
wider powers than are there given .... Art. 6, § 3 of the Constitution of the State of New York provides, with two exceptions not
relevant here, that the jurisdiction of the court of appeals shall be
limited to the review of questions of law in certain enumerated
cases. None of the situations could be construed to permit the
court to answer a question certified by a federal court or court of
another state. Thus, since it is clear that the Legislature does not
possess inherent power to expand the court's power... a constitutional amendment is necessary if New York is to have a certification procedure. 0 '
3.

The Constitutionality of a Certification Rule Under
NewJersey's Constitution

As discussed above, three possible sources of power to answer a
certified question exist under the New Jersey Constitution: (1) the
NewJersey Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, (2) its appellate jurisdiction, or (3) its rulemaking authority. This section of this Article
will first summarize the views of the Minority Report concerning
these available constitutional sources and then discuss whether any of
these provisions provide a constitutionally sound basis for the adoption of a certification rule in New Jersey.

191)

See Grantham v. Missouri Dep't of Corrections, No. 72576, 1990 WL 602159, at

*1 (Mo. July 13, 1990) relied on by Zeman v. V.F. Factory Outlet, Inc. 911 F.2d 107,
109 (8th Cir. 1990).
200

See NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, MEMORANDUM RELATING TO CERTI-

FICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, A. 5453-65 [B], 208th Sess.,

reprinted in 1985 N.Y. Laws 707-934, at 2577-91.
201
Id. at 2586. In 1985, New York amended its Constitution to allow for certification. For further discussion of the New York experience with certification, see Richard A. Nessler, InterjurisdictionalCertification in New York, 209 N.Y.L.J. 53, at 1 (Mar.
22, 1993) and Note, New York's Certification Procedure: Was It Worth the Wait?, 63 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 539 (1989).
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The Minority Report

The Minority Report rejected each of the three identified constitutional provisions as being insufficient to give the New Jersey Supreme Court the authority to hear certified questions or promulgate
a certification rule. Further, it rejected the proposition that the New
Jersey Legislature and/or the New Jersey Supreme Court through its
rulemaking authority can provide for the authority to consider certified questions.
The Minority Report first rejected the grant of appellate jurisdiction in article VI, section V, paragraph 1.202 While conceding that
subparagraph (e) of that provision20 3 "could be read to mean Rule of
Court as well as statute," the Minority Report ultimately concluded
that certification does not involve an "appeal" in the ordinary sense
of the word and that the grant of appellate jurisdiction, even though
capable of providing for appellate jurisdiction of kinds
not enumer4
ated in the state constitution, simply did not apply.0
The Minority Report next rejected the suggestion that the grant
of original jurisdiction contained in article VI, section V, paragraph 3
could provide
S
20520 a constitutional basis for the adoption of a certification
procedure.

Citing to In re LiVolsi, 2°° the Minority Report stated that

the NewJersey Constitution grants the state's highest court "'original
jurisdiction only over matters related to causes already before [the
court].'207

The Minority Report also rejected the constitutional grant of
authority to "make rules.., subject to law, governing practice and
procedure"208 as providing a sufficient basis to adopt a certification
procedure.2 The Minority Report states:
202
203

See Minority Report, supra note 84, at 8-9.
N.J. CONST. art. VI, § V, para. l(e) provides that appeals may be taken to the

NewJersey Supreme Court "in such cases as may be provided by law."
204 See Minority Report, supra note 84, at 9 ("[T] his reading
would do violence to
the ordinary meaning of the word 'appeal,' because the Supreme Court would not
be called upon to revise errors of law or fact made in a judgment reached below or
issue a mandate binding an inferior court."). But see In re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347, 352
(Wash. 1968) (explaining that the state may adopt a certification by "statute if it is
deemed to be a substantive matter, or by a rule of this court if it is deemed a matter
of 'practice and procedure"'). The authors agree that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction does not include the power to hear certified questions.
205 See Minority Report, supra note 84, at 9.
206 85 N.J. 576, 428 A.2d 1268
(1981).
207 Minority Report, supra note 84, at 9 (quoting LiVolsi, 85 N.J. at 583, 428 A.2d
at 1271).
208 N.J. CONSr. art. VI, § II, para. 3.
209 See Minority Report, supranote
84, at 9-10.
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There is a third granting clause in par. 3, authorizing the Court to
"make rules ... subject to law, governing practice and procedure." Might that clause be the source of a third kind of original
jurisdiction, in which certifications might be heard? We believe
not ....The practice and procedure power is explicitly subject to
(substantive) law, and any original jurisdiction arising under it
would be limited to adjective matters. Certifications,
by defini210
tion, involve questions of substantive state law.
Finally, the Minority Report rejected the contention that the
New Jersey Legislature could enlarge the New Jersey Supreme
Court's jurisdiction as a means of empowering it to answer certified
questions, reasoning that "[u] nder our constitution any legislative attempt to enlarge the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court di2' 1
minishes the constitutional jurisdiction of another court.

The Minority Report brushed aside the suggestion that the essence of state sovereignty in a federal system contains an implicit
grant of authority to the states' judicial bodies to determine state
212
law.
The views expressed in the Minority Report should not preclude
the adoption of a certification procedure in New Jersey. As discussed
further below, this Article suggests that, because answering a certified
question is not ajurisdictional act at all, the "practice and procedure"
provision provides the requisite authority for the promulgation of a
certification rule by the New Jersey Supreme Court, just as similar
constitutional provisions have accomplished in Idaho and Ohio.1 3
Moreover, the New Jersey Supreme Court's power to administer the
210
211

Id.
Id. at 12. While the Minority Report concludes that granting the NewJersey

Supreme Court power to answer certified questions would impinge on the constitutional jurisdiction of another court, see id., the report does not appear to reject the
rationale of Sun InsuranceOffice, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 742 (Fla. 1961), namely
that "constitutional jurisdiction can be enlarged by the legislature in all cases where
such enlargement does not result in a diminution of the constitutional jurisdiction
of some other court, or where such enlargement is not forbidden by the constitution." Id.
22 See Minority Report, supranote 84,
at 11. The report stated,
We are not convinced that the New Jersey Supreme Court would regard Erie as an affirmative grant of power to it from the federal government. Even if it were to do so, it is unclear where the Court would
get the capacity to accept such a gift from a foreign sovereign.
Id. (rejecting Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1079-80 (Ohio 1991)).
215
See Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 1144, 1148
(Idaho 1983) (noting that the Idaho Supreme Court's "rule-making power" incident
to its duty to administer justice under the Idaho Constitution provided authority to
adopt a certification rule); Scott, 577 N.E.2d at 1079 (upholding the constitutionality
of a certification procedure adopted by rule of the Ohio Supreme Court).
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court system within the state provides an adequate basis for promulgation of a certification rule. These bases separately would provide
ample constitutional support for the authority of the Court to answer
certified questions; taken together, they belie the contention that the
New Jersey Supreme Court is powerless to provide for a procedural
mechanism definitively to pronounce NewJersey law.
b.

The Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction Does Not
Provide a Source of Authority to Answer Certified
Questions

As might be gathered from the preceding summary, the authors
agree with the Minority Report's conclusion that the grant of original
jurisdiction found in article VI, section V, paragraph 3, of the New
Jersey Constitution cannot serve as a basis for the promulgation of a
certification rule. Therefore, if answering a certified question were
deemed to be an exercise of original jurisdiction, the New Jersey
Constitution would clearly forbid the Supreme Court of New Jersey
from doing so. 214
As a matter of black letter constitutional law, the NewJersey Legislature is precluded from providing the New Jersey Supreme Court
with original jurisdiction beyond the explicit grant found in the New
Jersey Constitution. In Brady v. New Jersey Redistricting Commission,1 5
the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered the constitutionality of
a provision in the statute creating the New Jersey Redistricting Commission.1
One provision of the act purported to confer "original
and exclusive jurisdiction" upon the New Jersey Supreme Court "to
consider any case brought upon the petition of a legally qualified
voter of the State and to grant relief appropriate to the cause. 2,

17

The

Court rejected this legislative attempt to create a new category of
original jurisdiction:
Although section 5, paragraph 3 of [article VI] grants this court
such original jurisdiction "as may be necessary to the complete
determination of any cause on review," the Court may exercise
that jurisdiction only in a case already before it. Because Brady

was not properly before the Court on appeal, we had no power to
exercise original jurisdiction through that clause. Our State Constitution therefore prohibits the Legislature from granting origi214 As is discussed further below, however,
answering a certified question cannot
properly be considered an exercise of original jurisdiction.
29 131 N.J. 594, 622 A.2d 843 (1992).
21 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:46-6 to -24 (West 1996); Brady, 131
N.J. at 600, 622
A.2d at 846.
217 Brady, 131 N.J. at 605, 622 A.2d
at 848.
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nal jurisdiction to this Court to decide challenges to the Redis218
tricting Commission's actions.
Given the holding in Brady and the fact that the New Jersey Constitution plainly does not enumerate original jurisdiction to answer certified questions, the authority to do so, if it exists, must be found elsewhere.1 9
c.

The Supreme Court's Rulemaking Authority

The thesis of this Section is that the certification process is not
an act ofjurisdiction and that the constitutional provisions regarding
the jurisdiction of the New Jersey Supreme Court and the inferior
New Jersey courts are irrelevant to ascertaining the source of judicial
power to answer a certified question. Rather, certification is a
mechanism related to the administration ofjustice within the state in essence providing for a procedural alternative to the customary
practice of filing a declaratory judgment action in the superior court
when a federal court abstains. When certification is understood as
such, it is clear that the New Jersey Supreme Court's rulemaking
authority provides a sufficient basis for adopting of the rule.
i.

The Metaphysics ofJurisdiction

The Minority Report's conclusion that Brady forecloses the New
Jersey Supreme Court from considering certified questions assumes
two critical facts: (1) that answering a certified question is jurisdictional; and (2) that, furthermore, it is an act of original jurisdiction.
Both of these implicit premises are incorrect.
Implicit in the Minority Report's conclusion that certification
necessarily invokes the court's original jurisdiction is the conclusion
that jurisdiction is, in its essence, the ability of a court to declare the
substantive law. While this power may be a necessary element of jurisdiction, without more it cannot be said to constitute the exercise of
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction entails not only the discernment of substantive legal principles, but also the inherent authority to find facts (at
least in the case of original
jurisdiction), to enter judgment, and to
2°
thatjudgment.1
enforce
Id. at 606, 622 A.2d at 848-49.
This conclusion is not problematic. As discussed further below, answering a
certified question, to the extent it is jurisdictional at all, cannot be said to constitute
the exercise of 'original' jurisdiction. The explicit limits on the NewJersey Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction, therefore, are of little consequence to the ultimate determination of the Court's authority to hear and answer questions certified to it.
22
See, e.g., Epstein v. Bendersky, 130 N.J. Eq. 180, 186, 21 A.2d 815, 818
(Ch.
1941). The Epstein court defined jurisdiction:
218

219
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Aside from discerning the pertinent principles of substantive
law, certification contains none of the attributes incident to the exercise of jurisdiction. In the certification process, unlike the declaratory judgment action following Pullman abstention, where the state
court is expected to find facts and render judgment, the facts are determined by the federal court before submission to the state high
court.22 ' It is the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction (usually its
Article III diversity jurisdiction) that is invoked by the parties and
that is the ultimate source of power to enforce the judgment entered.
Accordingly, the federal court would enter judgment, the federal
court would entertain motions to execute on the judgment, and the
United States Marshall would be called upon, if necessary, to enforce
the judgment. Put simply, it is the federal court that determines and
enforces the rights and obligations of the parties. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the Ohio and Oklahoma Supreme Courts have determined that certification simply is not jurisdictional and that any
explicit limitations on the constitutionally assigned original jurisdiction of their respective Supreme Courts did not impact on their
authority to entertain certified questions. 222
There is a second layer to the Minority Report's analysis that
merits discussion. In citing to Brady as imposing a limitation on the
ability of the New Jersey Legislature to provide for additional categories of original jurisdiction beyond those explicitly enumerated in the
constitution, the Minority Report assumes that certification would
entail the exercise of originaljurisdiction. Original jurisdiction connotes two elements that are not present in the certification process:
(1) on a literal level that the proceeding have commenced in the particular court in question; 223 and (2) on a more substantive level, that
When we speak of the jurisdiction of a court under our constitution, as
I now do, we refer to its power to entertain a certain class of litigation,
or a particular cause, and to render a judgment therein which will be
binding on the parties who are lawfully before the court.
Id.; see also Police Comm'r.of Boston v. Mun. Court of the Dorchester Dist., 374 N.E.
272, 285 (Mass. 1977) ("Jurisdiction concerns and defines the power of courts, encompassing the power to inquire into facts, apply the law, make decisions, and declare judgment."); State v. Osborne, 32 N.J. 117, 122, 160 A.2d 42, 45 (1960)
('Jurisdiction ...is the power... to hear and determine causes.") (emphasis
added).
M See, e.g., UNIF. CERTIF. OF QUESTIONS OF LAW [AcT] [RULE] (1995) § 6(a)(2), 12
U.L.A. 75 (1996) (requiring the certifying court to submit a statement of "the facts
relevant to the question").
2
See supra text accompanying notes 188-93.
223 See Handleman v. Marwen Stores Corp., 53 N.J. 404, 412, 251 A.2d
122,'126-27
(1969) ("We interpret 'exclusive original jurisdiction' as used in N.J.S.A. 34:15-49 to
mean only that workmen's compensation cases must arise in the first instance in the
Workmen's Compensation Division.").
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the court having original jurisdiction, in contradistinction to appellate jurisdiction, act as the finder of fact or oversee that process. 4 Of
course, neither of these essential attributes is present in the certification process. The case originates in federal court, and, as adverted to
earlier, the federal court retains the power to resolve the factual disputes among the parties.
The Minority Report considered and rejected the argument that
certification is notjurisdictional:
It seems to us that two things are wrong with this position. The
first is that 'jurisdiction" is notjust the issuance of a coercive final
order. We believe "simply answering specific legal questions,"
should properly be considered as much an exercise ofjurisdiction
in connection with certifications as it is with declaratory judgments ....This is particularly true when certification answers are
to be given the effect of binding precedent, as the Majority Report advocates.2 5
In the authors' view, these arguments do not alter the conclusion
that certification is not jurisdictional. In a declaratory judgment action, the state court enters judgment, and if the judgment is disobeyed, state mechanisms are invoked to enforce it.26 In a certification procedure, however, there exists a clear division of authority
between determining the applicable law, on one hand, and applying
and enforcing it on the other. 7
The precedential effect of the state court's answer is irrelevant to
the question of jurisdiction. The effect given the judgment entered
by courts in either subsequent litigation between the parties or between other parties that raise the same issue is the result of judgemade rules of convenience and judicial economy and has little to do
with the essence of jurisdiction - power to enter a conclusive judgment between the parties before the court.n" Indeed, it is possible to
224

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1099 (6th ed. 1990) (defining original jurisdiction

as "U]urisdiction to take cognizance of a cause at its inception, try it, and pass judgment upon the law and facts").
225 Minority Report, supra note 84,
at 10 (citations omitted).
226 See, e.g., N.J. CT. R_ 4:59-1 (setting forth procedure
for enforcing judgment).
27 See supra, text accompanying
notes 219-21.
28 See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106,
119 (1940) ("Stare decisis is a
principle of policy."); People v. Cuevas, 906 P.2d 1290, 1301 (Cal. 1995) (policy of
stare decisis "'based on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in
the law are the major objective of the legal system'") (citation omitted); People v.
Bing, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (N.Y. 1990) ("Although a court should be slow to overrule its precedents, there is little reason to avoid doing so when persuaded by the
lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning."); Otter Tail Power Co. v.
Von Bank, 8 N.W.2d 599, 607 (N.D. 1942) ("Stare decisis is a rule of policy
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conceive of a judicial universe without these judge-made doctrines,
where a decision would only be binding on the parties before the
court, and then only if not overturned by a subsequent court ruling.
While such a system would no doubt be extremely inefficient, there
would be no cause to question the validity of the first court's judgment or its ability to enforce it as the prevailing norm between the
parties.
ii.

The Scope of the Supreme Court's Rulemaking
Authority: The Winbery Decision

If not exercising jurisdiction, what then would the New Jersey
Supreme Court be doing if it responded to a question of law submitted by a federal court? This Article submits that the answer to this
question is two-fold. First, through its unquestioned exclusive and
plenary power under the New Jersey Constitution to make rules governing practice and procedure, it would be providing for, and acting
upon, a procedure for cooperation between state and federal courts
to assist the federal court in meeting its obligation under Erie to apply
NewJersey substantive law. Second, through its exclusive administrative power over the New Jersey court system, it would be providing a
procedural alternative for pronouncing New Jersey substantive law
that avoids the delays and expenses attendant to the typical declaratory judgment action filed when a federal court abstains pursuant to
Pullman. Both of these powers are subsumed within the New Jersey
Supreme Court's rulemaking authority, which is discussed below.
The New Jersey Constitution provides: "The Supreme Court
shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the
State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all such
courts."2
In Winbery v. Salisbury,30 the New Jersey Supreme Court
had to decide whether a statute enacted prior to the adoption of the
1947 Constitution, allowing one year for taking appeals, preempted
the rules promulgated by the Court limiting the time for taking appeals to forty-five days. The Court interpreted article VI's "subject to
law" limitation to refer to laws "substantive in content," but not to the
court's powers of rulemaking with respect to practice and procedure.23 ' The New Jersey Supreme Court held this power to be exclugrounded on the theory that when a legal principle is accepted and established,

rights may accrue under it and security and certainty require that the principle be
recognized and followed thereafter even though it later be found to be not legally
sound.").
M NJ.CONST. art. 6, § 2,
para. 3.
230
2s1

5 NJ. 240, 74A.2d 406 (1950).
See id. at 247-48, 74 A.2d at 410.
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sively its own. The Court concluded that "the rulemaking power of
the Supreme Court is not subject to overriding legislation, but that 2it
is confined to practice, procedure and administration as such.1
Within this province, as Winbeny made clear, the NewJersey Supreme
Court's power is absolute. There is no authority on the part of the
other branches of government to deal with the subject.
The procedural aspect of certification was recognized by the first
Supreme Court to adopt such a rule -

Florida's

-

and the last to do

so - California's. The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Clay upheld the constitutionality of its rule of court providing for certification based on the provision of the Florida Constitution giving the
Florida Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules governing
practice and procedure:
The statute authorized this court to provide, by rule of court, for
the certification to it by federal appellate courts of questions of
state law determinative of a cause pending in a federal court,
"which certificate the supreme court of this state, by written opinion, may answer." Rule 4.61 of the Florida Appellate Rules was
adopted by this Court "pursuant to the power vested in this Court
under Article V of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. to adopt rules
governing the practice and procedure in all courts of this
State .... " The Rule re-stated the provisions of the statute and
added details relating to the form and content of the certificate.
Its adoption was a valid exercise of our organic power and provided a procedure for assisting, in a spirit of comity, the Federal
Appellate system in questions of state jurisprudence, no other forum for so doing having been established by the laws of Florida.
It is obvious, therefore, that we need not concern ourselves
with the question of whether this court derives its authority to entertain the subject proceeding from
the statute or from the rule
33
since, in either case, we have

2

it.2

Id. at 255, 74 A.2d at 414; see also Benjamin Kaplan & Warren J. Greene, The

Legislature's Relation to JudicialRule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65
HARv. L. REv. 234 (1951); Eli L. Warach, Note, The Rule-Making Power: Subject to
Law, 5 RUTGERS L. REv. 376 (1950). For further discussion of the rules of court and
the Winbery decision, see Conversations with Morris M. Schnitzer, 47 RUTGERS L. REv.
1391 (1995); RobertJ. Kerekes, The Crisis of Congested Courts: One Potential Solution,
18 SETON HALL LEGIS.J. 489, 499-502 (1994); Hon. Marie L. Garibaldi, The NewJersey
Experience: Accommodating the Separation Between the Legislature and the Judiciary, 23
SETONHALLL. REv. 3 (1992).
233 Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 741 (Fla. 1961); see
also In re Florida Appellate Rules, 127 So. 2d 444, 444 (Fla. 1961). The Court stated,
Pursuant to the power vested in this Court under Article V of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. to adopt rules governing the practice and procedure in all courts of this State and in recognition of the Provisions of
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The Minority Report's implicit conclusion, therefore, that the Florida
certification rule is premised upon an extra-constitutional grant of
jurisdiction to entertain certified questions 4 is only partially correct.
As the above quote demonstrates, the Florida Supreme Court found
the constitutional grant of rulemaking authority to be a sound basis
upon which to rest its certification procedure separate and apart
from any jurisdictional grant from the Florida Legislature.
The California Supreme Court, one of the most recent high
courts to adopt a certification procedure by rule, was more explicit in
basing its authority to adopt a certification procedure on its rulemaking authority.23 5 In a detailed internal memorandum, the California
Supreme Court first considered whether a certification procedure
was desirable in the abstract.2 6 In concluding that a certification
procedure was desirable, the memorandum noted that certification
promotes comity and protects state sovereignty.237 The memorandum
also rejected the concerns that certification would unduly burden the
Courtes and that California's "case law" rule against advisory opinions
precluded adoption of the procedure.2 3

9

The memorandum next

considered whether adoption of a certification rule would offend the
California Constitution, and concluded that article VI, section 1240
Section 25.031, Florida Statutes 1959, F.S.A., the Florida Appellate
Rules, 31 F.S.A. are hereby amending in the following respects
[provisions regarding certified questions, etc.].
Id.; see also Note, Certifying Questions To State Supreme Courts As a Remedy To The Abstention Doctrine,9 S.D. L. REV. 158, 170 (1964) (discussing the procedural nature of certification).
234 See Minority Report, supra
note 84, at 11.
235 See CAL. R. CT. 29.5 (adopted effective January 1, 1998).
The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court adopted an interim certification procedure by rule on October 28,
1998. See supra, note 9.
236 See CALIFORNIA MEMORANDUM, supra note 95, at 6.
237 See id. at 7.
238 See id. at 7-8 ("I agree with the memos that
the fears of some that this court
would be unduly burdened by requests for certification appear to be unfounded.")
(internal citations omitted).
239 See id. at 8. The memorandum
instructed:
The vast majority of out-of-state authority holds that a state high
court's opinion answering a certified question is not an impermissible
advisory opinion so long as: (i) the court addresses only issues that are
truly contested by the parties, (ii) the court addresses only issues that are
presented on a fully developed factual record; and (iii) the court's opinion
on the certified question may be dispositive of the cause (and will be res judicata between the parties). Because the proposed rule would include
and impose these conditions, an opinion on certification would not be
an impermissible "advisory opinion."
Id.

I40 See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (providing that "[t]hejudicial power of this State is
vested in the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, and municipal
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provided "inherent judicial power" to consider certified questions.24'
Finally, the memorandum discussed the authority of the California
Supreme Court to adopt a certification procedure by court rule, 2
rather than by statute or legislative enactment. The following observation is relevant to the question whether the New Jersey Supreme
Court can adopt the procedure by rule:
[I]f we were to support adoption of a certification procedure, it
would be preferable to select the course taken by many of our sister states, and seek implementation of a certification procedure
by rule enacted by the Judicial Council pursuant to its constitu-

tional authority to create rules for court administration (see art.
VI, § 6), rather than by a statute enacted by the Legislature, or by
constitutional amendment. The Judicial Council is the entity
charged by the Constitution with authority to consider and enact
rules of judicial practice and procedure, and is equipped to address issues such as this. 43

In addition to falling within the New Jersey Supreme Court's broad
rulemaking authority with respect to practice and procedure, the
proposed certification rule falls within the article VI mandate to
promulgate rules regarding the administration of the courts. In the
courts, all of which are courts of record").
241 The memorandum suggests that answering a certified question is a jurisdictional act. See CALIFORNIA MEMORANDUM, supra note 95, at 9 ("I believe that it would
be possible, in a future opinion of this court, to . . . articulate a reasoned basis on
which we might conclude that exercise of jurisdiction over a certified question is a
proper attribute of 'inherent judicial power."'). The authors, as stated above, disagree with the view that answering a certified question requires a jurisdictional grant,
inherent or explicit. The NewJersey Supreme Court, therefore, need not search the
New Jersey Constitution for an implied grant of power to answer certified questions,
because it can utilize the explicit grant of power to promulgate rules of administration and procedure to achieve this end. See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying
text.
242 See CAL. CONST. art. VI, §
6:
To improve the administration of justice, the council [consisting of
two Supreme CourtJustices and a number of lower court judges] shall
survey judicial business and make recommendations to the courts,
make recommendations annually to the Governor and the Legislature,
adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure, not inconsistent with statute, and perform other functions prescribed by
statute.
243 CALIFORNIA MEMORANDUM, supra note 95, prepared
for California's Supreme
Court with respect to the Court's consideration of a certification rule (on file with
the authors). In In re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347, 358 (Wash. 1968), the Washington Supreme Court also emphasized the essentially procedural nature of certification even
though the certification procedure there was enacted by statute. See id. at 350
(discussing the burden placed on litigants and courts by abstention and characterizing certification as "a procedure whereby litigants in federal court actions might obtain answers, in an expeditious manner, to questions of state law").
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absence of a certification procedure, federal courts are forced to
hazard a guess at the state's substantive law, or abstain. Insofar as the
federal courts avail themselves of the latter option, the administration of justice within New Jersey is undoubtedly and profoundly affected. As the Washington Supreme Court stated:
The great burden created by the abstention doctrine is the matter
of delay. If the doctrine is invoked, the parties may appeal to the
United States District Courts of Appeal and possibly to the United
States Supreme Court. If the case is stayed or dismissed, the litigant must bring the case in the state courts. The parties must obtain a decision from the highest state court.
The delay and expense give advantage to a financially-endowed litigant, and he may be able to control the forum.
He can intentionally choose federal adjudication in a case reasonably certain to be sent back to the state court. In this way the
adversary who is less able financially may be forced to settle or
abandon his suit.
Thus the legislature, in enacting Laws of 1965, ch. 99, sought
to afford a procedure whereby litigants in federal court actions
might obtain answers, in an expeditious manner, to questions of
state law which controlled the disposition of their cases. The procedure is a shortcut, eliminating the necessity of instituting a declaratoryjudgment action in the superior court and taking an appeal to this court. The statute is not designed to increase the
work load of this court, but rather to simplify the procedure for
obtaining decisions
on state questions which are relevant in fed2 44

eral

court suits.

Because a certification procedure would be enacted to ease the
burden of the state's trial courts in this manner, it clearly falls within
the ambit of the New Jersey Supreme Court's article VI power. In
State v. Leonardis, 45 for example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
considered whether its adoption by court rule of a pretrial intervention program in criminal cases in lieu of prosecution fell within the
court's article VI power. It held that, because the rule was designed
to minimize the impact of an increasing caseload on the administration of criminal justice, the rule was properly promulgated.2 46 Since a
certification rule would provide a procedural alternative to the costly
process incident to Pullman abstention - a declaratory action filed
first in the state's trial courts, which must then wend through the in-

244
245
246

Elliott, 446 P.2d at 349-50.
71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976) on reh'g73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977).
See id. at 108-10, 363 A.2d at 333-34.
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termediate appellate courts and ultimately to the state's highest
courtit would undoubtedly impact the caseload of the lower
courts in New Jersey.4 7 It would also relate to the administration of
justice by avoiding the evils identified by the Elliott Court - forum
shopping by deep-pocketed litigants." 8 Accordingly, promulgation of
a certification rule falls squarely within the administrative province of
the NewJersey Supreme Court.
Considered either as a procedure arising out of comity, or as a
means of effectively reducing adjudicative burdens in the state, certification can and should be promulgated by rule of the New Jersey
Supreme Court pursuant to its article VI rulemaking power.
III.
The remainder of this Article will discuss the proposed certification rule attached to the Majority Report prepared by the Subcommittee on Certification. This Article will suggest that federal district
courts, in addition to federal appellate courts, should be given the
authority to propose certified questions to the New Jersey Supreme
Court. In addition, this Article will propose certain modifications to
the rule proposed by the subcommittee, which it will incorporate
into a proposed rule in Section Ill(D).
The Majority Report contains a proposed draft model rule for
certification, which reads as follows:
2:2-2A Answering Certified Questions of Law
(a) The Supreme Court may answer a question of law certified to
it by any appellate court of the United States, or by the highest
247 In providing for this procedural alternative to filing a declaratory judgment
action, a certification rule would not run afoul of Brady by conferring original jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court. Certification, as discussed above, does not entail
the typical fact-finding incidents of original jurisdiction, and therefore cannot properly be considered the exercise of such. The Supreme Court, by accepting the federal court's findings of fact and articulating the law of New Jersey, engages in a
process of cooperative federalism that relieves the state trial courts and intermediate
appellate courts of the burdens associated with fact finding and substantive law de-

termination incident to Pullman abstention.

See supra text accompanying note 244. The Minority Report disputes the contention that the New Jersey Supreme Court's rulemaking authority confers upon it
the power to promulgate a certification rule. See Minority Report, supra note 84, at
10 ("The practice and procedure power is explicitly subject to (substantive) law, and
any original jurisdiction arising under it would be limited to adjective matters. Certifications, by definition, involve questions of substantive state law."). In the authors'
248

view, the Supreme Court's rulemaking authority, as exemplified by the Leonardis decision, which upheld the constitutionality of a rule creating a pre-trial alternative to
incarceration, is broader than that identified by the Minority Report and can involve
"substantive" matters within the scope ofjudicial administration.
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court of another state, if the answer would be determinative of a
pending litigation in the certifying court and New Jersey law on
the issue is unsettled.
(b) The Supreme Court may reformulate a question of law certified to it.
(c)

A certification shall contain:
(i)

The question or questions to be answered.

(ii)

A statement of the facts relevant to the question.

(iii) The names and addresses of the counsel of record and
of parties appearing without counsel.
(d) The Supreme Court may require the certifying court to supply it with the record of the matter certified, or a portion thereof.
(e) No papers, other than those described in subsections (c) and
(d) of this rule may be filed in connection with a certification, except by leave of court.
(f)

A.

[Reserved]

The ProperScope of Inter-JurisdictionalCertification: District
Courts Should Be Permitted to Propound Certified Questions

The authors' most fundamental objection to the proposed rule
is its restrictive scope, at least as it regards federal courts. 24 9 Federal
district courts should be given the authority to propound questions
to the New Jersey Supreme Court for several reasons. First, many
important issues arise in district court proceedings, and, for whatever
reason, are not the subject of an appeal; the New Jersey Supreme
Court should have the discretionary power to identify serious state
law issues that arise in this manner and shape the state's substantive
law accordingly. Second, while development of a factual record is
sometimes desirable, there are often times when a purely legal issue
is. presented. Waiting until the case has been tried and appealed in
such cases results in an unnecessary burden on both the litigants and
the judiciary.25° Third, and somewhat relatedly, since the New Jersey
Supreme Court retains complete discretion over which certified

249
In the authors' view, the proposed rule appropriately recognizes the importance of state-to-state certification of questions of New Jersey law by allowing the
highest courts of other states to request answers to certified questions. For a thorough and compelling presentation outlining the benefits of interstate certification,
and lamenting its under use, see Robbins, Interstate Certification,supra note 7.
250 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S.
Ct. 1055, 1073 (1997)
(rebuking federal district court for failing to certify purely legal question of Arizona

law).
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questions to answer, it can weed out cases that are factually underdeveloped and maintain control over its docket by answering only those
certified questions the Court itself identifies as sufficiently pressing
and factually developed.
Allowing a district court to propound certified questions avoids
the delays associated with Pullman abstention. The United States Supreme Court recently opined on this issue, and indirectly endorsed
2 5'
district court certification, in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona.
In that case, a state employee brought suit against Arizona, its governor and attorney general, and various governmental agencies seeking
an injunction against enforcement of an amendment to the Arizona
Constitution purporting to make English the state's official language.
Despite several requests from the parties during the eight years the
case was litigated, the District Court and the Ninth Circuit declined
to seek an authoritative construction of the scope of the amendment
through the state's certification procedure. (A narrow construction
might have avoided finding the amendment violative of the United
States Constitution).
Rejecting the narrow construction of the
amendment offered by Arizona's Attorney General, both the District
Court and the Ninth Circuit found the amendment overbroad and
facially invalid. The United States Supreme Court ultimately vacated
the lower courts' determination that the amendment violated the
United States Constitution, because the named plaintiff had resigned
her position and the controversy had therefore become moot. The
opinion, nevertheless, discussed the availability of certification in Arizona, and admonished both the Ninth Circuit and the District Court
for their failure to utilize it:
Both lower federal courts in this case refused to invite the aid of
the Arizona Supreme Court because they found the language of
Article XXVIII "plain," and the Attorney General's limiting construction unpersuasive .... A more cautious approach was in order ....
The course of [plaintiff's] case was complex. The complexity
might have been avoided had the District Court, more than eight
years ago, accepted the certification suggestion made by Arizona's
Attorney General. 252
The lack of a certification procedure for district courts also pressures district courts to abstain pursuant to Pullman, thus causing un-.
warranted delays and expense for litigants and both the federal and

251
252

117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997).
Id. at 1073-75 (emphasis added).
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state systems.5 3 Allowing district courts the option of propounding
certified questions, therefore, would obviate the tortuous Pullman
process and alleviate the burdens on state trial courts of litigating declaratory judgment actions initiated there after the federal court abstains. 54
In addition to reducing delays, allowing federal district courts to
propound certified questions permits the New Jersey Supreme Court
to identify and adjudicate important issues of state law. Since most
district courtjudgments are not appealed,2 55 a rule preventing federal
district judges from propounding certified questions would reduce
the pool of certified issues arbitrarily to a subset of questions that
have been appealed by litigants. There is no logical reason that this
subset should correlate with those issues that are necessarily of importance to the state; rather, they most likely correlate to the litigiousness of the parties and/or their financial resources. In any
event, placing this kind of artificial constraint on the universe of eligible certification issues makes little sense and reduces the ability of
the New Jersey Supreme Court to define the substantive law of the
state.
The issue that seems most prominent in the minds of opponents
of federal district court certification is the fear of docket inundation.
The simple answer is that it has not been a problem in the jurisdictions that allow district courts to propound certified questions, and
there is little reason to believe the experience in NewJersey would be
different. 256 Even if federal district judges were prone to overusing
the certification device, the New Jersey Supreme Court would retain
ultimate control of the process and could limit its interjurisdictional

See Braun, supra note 12, at 957 ("Permitting district courts to certify questions
would ... reduc[e] the need for Pullman abstention [and cause] a consequent re253

duction on the state trial court caseload.").
254 See Arizonans for Official English, 117 S. Ct. at 1073 ("Certification
procedure, in

contrast, allows a federal court faced with a novel state-law question to put the question directly to the State's highest court, reducing the delay, cutting the cost, and
increasing the assurance of gaining an authoritative response.").

See, e.g., Goldschmidt, supra note 9, at 59 (quoting a federal district judge:
"I'm a district courtjudge - 80% of my litigated cases are not appealed - only 10%
of my cases are litigated. It's important that my decisions are just; that means deciding correctly according to governing law of the governing jurisdiction - the procedure should be available to me.").
256 See Braun, supra note 12, at 957-58 ("The literature
indicates that certification
has been used very sparingly, and that there has been no avalanche even in those
states which permit district court certification."); Medina, supra note 12, at 114
("Empirical evidence from states which permit district court certification shows that
state appellate dockets are not flooded by questions certified from district courts.").
255
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certification docket just as it limits its intrajurisdictional certification
docket.
Another oft-repeated concern is that the factual record will not
be sufficiently developed in the lower court seeking to certify state
law questions. Two answers to this perceived dilemma are readily
apparent. First, as a practical matter, the New Jersey Supreme Court
can simply decline to answer the certified question if the factual record is insufficiently developed (or for any reason at all). Second, the
proposed rule, at paragraph (c) (2), would require a statement of the
facts, which should allay concerns that the legal issues are being presented in a factual vacuum. 257
Most importantly, however, allowing district courts to propound
certified questions allows the state judiciary to define the substantive
rules that govern New Jersey citizens regardless of whether the issues
survive the trial court gauntlet and receive appellate review. Allowing
district courts to propound certified questions recognizes that it is
not the origin of the question that matters, but rather its substance.2If the record is sufficiently developed at the trial level (as with purely
legal questions), and the question is important enough for Supreme
Court attention, it would be counterproductive to decline to entertain the question because it is propounded by a district judge, rather
than an appellate panel.
B.

"Would Be" vs. "May Be:" The Proposed Rule's Overly Restrictive
DeterminativenessRequirement

The draft certification rule included with the Majority Report
proposes to limit certification to instances in which the certified answer "would be" determinative of the litigation in the certifying court.
This language would be unique to New Jersey's certification procedure, would encourage undue litigation regarding whether a question is determinative of the entire litigation, would restrict the scope
of certification to a small subset of legal issues that would dispose of
an entire litigation, and would frustrate the promotion of a uniform
certification procedure.25"9 For these reasons, the authors recom257

See Medina, supra note 12, at 114 ("The fear that district court certification will

be particularly conducive to abstract state opinions is similarly unfounded. All certification procedures require either a statement of facts or a stipulation of facts; thus,
a factual record will exist.").
2
See Robbins, Proposalfor Reform, supa note 12, at 134-36 (arguing that allowing
district courts to certify is important to resolve major issues early in the litigation, to
avoid loss of decision when a party fails to appeal, and to provide uniformity and fair
judicial decisions).
259 See UNIF. CERTIF. OF QUESTIONS OF LAW [AcT] [RuLE] (1995), Prefatory Note, 12
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mend that the New Jersey Supreme Court adopt a rule providing for
the authority to certify when a question "may be" determinative of an
issue in the litigation.
The phrase "would be determinative of a pending litigation,"
while not completely clear, most likely is meant to mean that the certified issue be potentially dispositive of the entire litigation when it is
applied in the future by the certifying court, although this meaning
would have been better conveyed by the phrase "will be determinative of a pending litigation." In this sense, the proposed language is
closest to the minority of jurisdictions that require that the certified
answer "is" determinative of the underlying litigation. 60 In the
authors' view, this language unduly restricts the ability of the certifying court to propound questions and is unnecessary in light of the
discretion retained by the New Jersey Supreme Court to reject any
certified questions propounded to it.
The determinativeness requirement is designed to avoid the
"advisory opinion" dilemma by ensuring that the certified question, if
answered, actually will be given effect in the pending litigation.2 6'
The "may be determinative" language is sufficient to guard against
the evils of quasi-advisory opinions without unduly restricting the
ability of certifying courts to propound, and answering courts to answer, important issues of state law that may or may not, depending on
the answer, dispose of all aspects of the litigation.262 Requiring that
the answer to the certified question "would be" determinative of the
pending litigation would "spawn satellite controversies over whether

U.L.A. 69 (1996) (explaining that the inconsistency of statutory language among
states has significantly impeded use of certification). The benefits of adopting a uniform statute in the certification context have been noted by the Oregon Supreme
Court. See Western Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811 P.2d 627,
629 n.2 (Or. 1991) ("Because our statute is based on a uniform law there exist useful
commentary on the Uniform Act, instructive case law from other uniform-law jurisdictions, and informative academic treatment of the subject.") (citing 12 U.L.A. 49
(1975 & Supp. 1990); WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 6,
§ 4248).
260 See Goldschmidt, supra note 9, at 18-19 (listing states that use "is determinative" language).
261 See Robbins, Proposal for Reform, supra note 12, at 148 (maintaining that
the
"may be determinative" language "ensures that resolving the state law is necessary to
the resolution of the federal-court case").
262 See Schleiter v. Carlos, 775 P.2d 709, 710 (N.M. 1989)
(enunciating that a rule
providing that certification request set forth "either a statement by the certifying
court of the facts relevant to the question certified, showing the nature of the controversy in which the questions arose, or a stipulation of such facts by the parties,
which has been approved by the certifying court" effectively avoids rendering advisory opinions).
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in light of the ultimate outcome
the question was properly certified
3

of the underlying litigation.

,1

For similar reasons, the authors recommend against the proposed language requiring the answer to be determinative of a
"pending litigation." Requiring the answer to be potentially dispositive of the entire litigation, rather than an issue in it, is unduly restrictive and likely to lead to unproductive bickering regarding issues
collateral to the issue of law presented by the certified question. The
authors would recommend instead the following language: "may be
determinative of an issue in the pending litigation. 26
C.

"Unsettled" vs. "No ControllingPrecedent:" The Proposed Rule's
Ambiguous PrecedentialRequirement

The draft certification rule also proposes to limit certification to
instances where New Jersey law is "unsettled." This language has no
clear analogues in any of the various states to have adopted a certification procedure. It is bound, therefore, to derail efforts to promote
a uniform certification procedure and to engender litigation regarding what legal questions are "unsettled." The authors propose to
limit the availability of certification to those legal issues regarding
which there is no controlling New Jersey Supreme Court decision,
NewJersey constitutional provision, or NewJersey statute.
Some states (such as California), and the 1995 Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Rule, limit the authority to certify to instances where there is no controlling appellate precedent, either
from the state's highest court or the state's intermediate appellate
courts. In the authors' view, it is unnecessary to preclude certifying
courts from propounding certified questions when there are intermediate appellate court decisions on point. As set forth above, a federal court applying state law is not obligated to apply a decision of an
intermediate appellate court 65 and, therefore, the intermediate ap263

UNIF. CERTIF. OF QUESTIONS OF LAW [Acr] [RULE] (1995)

§ 2 cmt., 12 U.L.A. 73

(1996); see also Robbins, Proposalfor Reform, supra note 12, at 180. The "must be determinative" standard
leads to counterproductive battles concerning which questions should
be answered. The answering and certifying courts then become
bogged down in procedural rather than substantive determinations.
The 'must be determinative' language shackles certifying court, placing procedural locks on certification of the question when the process
requires openness in order to function properly.
Id.
264 UNIF. CERTIF. OF QUESTIONS OF LAw [AcT] [RULE] (1995) § 2(2), 12
U.L.A. 72

(1996).
26 See supra, text accompanying notes 129-31.
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pellate decision cannot be said to be controlling of the parties'
rights. The New Jersey Supreme Court would, under the proposed
rule, maintain complete discretionary authority to decline to answer
the certified question. Therefore, if there were no precedent from
the state's highest court, but the intermediate appellate decision appeared to control, the Supreme Court of New Jersey could decline to
answer or, if it felt the intermediate court's decision was incorrect,
could overrule the decision.26 " Given the discretion inherent in the
rule, it simply is not necessary to place overly restrictive barriers on
the certifying court's ability to request an answer from the New Jersey
Supreme Court.
D. A ProposedModel Rule
The certification rule proposed here by the authors is modeled
after the 1995 Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Rule. 67
While other certification procedures have been adopted and could
26
1 in the interests of uniformity, the authors
provide a helpful modelY
to adopt the 1995 uniform rule, with
believe it would be desirable
27 °
certain minor adjustments.

266

See Braun, supra note 12, at 959-60.

267 UNIF. CERTIF. OF QUESTIONS OF LAW [AcT] [RULE] (1995)

§§ 1-14, 12 U.L.A. 71-

79 (1996).
2GS In particular, California's recently adopted rule, while it strays from the
uniform rule in many respects, is comprehensive and has been analyzed usefully in the
literature. SeeBraun, supra note 12.
20 There are, in fact, two uniform rules at present, one promulgated in 1967 and
the second in 1995. The majority of adopting jurisdictions have enacted variants of
the 1967 uniform act, therefore making it an attractive candidate for adoption by
NewJersey. To date, only two states, Maryland and West Virginia, have adopted the
1995 uniform act. See MD. CODEANN., Crs &JUD. PROC., §§ 12-601 to -603 (1996); W.

VA. CODE §§ 51-1A-1 to -13 (1996). Nevertheless, the authors feel that the 1995 act
refines the 1967 uniform act in desirable ways, and therefore would recommend its
adoption over the 1967 uniform act.
Two of these variations become readily apparent. The first two sections of the
1995 uniform act, dealing with definitions of states and Native American tribes
(Section 1) and the power of the state Supreme Court to certify questions to other
state courts (Section 2), are, in the authors' view, unnecessary, and are therefore not
reproduced. Section 7 of the uniform act, which is designed to afford docket priority to certified questions, is also, in the authors' view, an unnecessary intrusion into
the internal operations of the New Jersey Supreme Court, and is therefore not reproduced in the authors' proposed rule. Sections 12, 13, and 14, which respectively
proscribe uniformity of application and construction, provide for a short title, and
provide for an effective date, are similarly omitted as being unnecessary.
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Text of Proposed Rule:
2:2-2A. Answering Certified Questions of Law
(a) The Supreme Court of this State may answer a question of law
certified to it by any appellate or district court of the United
States, or by the highest court of another state, if the answer may
be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling Supreme Court' decision,
constitutional provision, or statute of this State.
(b) The Supreme Court may reformulate a question of law certified
to it.
(c) The court certifying a question of law to the Supreme Court
shall issue a certification order and forward it to the Supreme
Court. Before responding to a certified question, the Supreme
Court may require the certifying court to deliver all or part of its
record to the Supreme Court.
(d) A certification order must contain:
(1) the question (s)27 of law to be answered;

(2) the facts relevant to the question, showing fully the nature of
the controversy out of which the question arose;
(3) a statement acknowledging that the Supreme Court, acting
as the receiving court, may reformulate the question; and
(4) the names and addresses of counsel of record and parties
appearing without counsel.273
(e) The Supreme Court shall issue an order accepting or denying
the request for an answer to the certified question(s). If the Supreme Court accepts the request, it shall announce that deter-

271

The uniform rule here reads "no controlling appellate decision." The authors

reasons for rejecting this language are set forth above. See supra text accompanying
notes 264-65.
27
The uniform rule contains only the singular. The authors' language clarifies
that one certification request may seek the answers to more than one legal question.
273 The uniform rule contains an additional
subparagraph, which reads:
(b) If the parties cannot agree upon a statement of facts, the certifying court shall determine the relevant facts and state them as part of
the certification order.
UNIF. CERTIF. OF QUESTIONS OF LAW [AcT] [RULE] (1995) § 6(b), 12 U.L.A. 75 (1996).
In the authors' view, this additional provision is confusing, in that it implies that the
statement of facts in the certification order is not necessarily crafted by the certifying
court. In order to avoid contentiousness, the statement of facts in the certification
order should always be crafted by the certifying court; to the extent the certifying
court wishes to adopt procedures to encourage stipulations of the facts by the parties, it should do so. The rule adopted by the answering court, however, should not
confuse the issue by injecting this element of potential confusion into the process.
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mination in the manner that it announces the acceptance of
274
cases for review.
(f) After the Supreme Court has accepted a certified question, the
New Jersey Rules of Court for briefing, argument, and conduct
of appeals shall govern further proceedings, unless the Supreme
Court otherwise provides. 75
(g) The Supreme Court shall state in a written opinion the law answering the certified question and send a copy of the opinion to
the certifying court, counsel of record, and parties appearing
without counselY.
(h) Fees and costs are the same as in civil appeals docketed before
the Supreme Court and must be equally divided between the
parties unless otherwise ordered by the certifying court.
IV.
A certification procedure should be adopted by the New Jersey
Supreme Court for both philosophical and practical reasons. Certification advances cooperative judicial federalism and allocates the responsibility for adjudicating state law appropriately to the judicial
body most suited to the task. It advances the interests of New Jersey's
citizens and judiciary by placing the responsibility for deciding important state issues, and charting important state policy, where it belongs - with the highest court of the state. It serves the interest of
litigants and the courts by improving the litigation process, providing
authoritative and binding pronouncements of state law, and reducing
the delays and costs resulting from Pullman abstention. The practical
concerns that have been raised are red herrings. The experiences of
other populous states, such as California, Florida, and New York,
This section, modeled after CAL. R. CT. 29.5(g), is designed to replace Section
7 of the uniform rule, which, as noted above, injects an undesirable element of control over the NewJersey Supreme Court's docket.
275 The language in this section differs slightly from the language in the uniform
act, and adheres more closely to the California certification rule. See CAL. R. CT.
29.5(g) (1). The only substantive departure is the elimination of the following language from the uniform act's section: "Procedures for certification from this State
to a receiving court are those provided in the rules and statutes of the receiving forum." In the authors' view, this language is not necessary and is therefore eliminated from their proposed rule.
26 To allay any fears that the certifying court
would not follow the certified answer, the NewJersey rule could, just as its California counterpart, include an explicit
provision mandating that the certifying court follow the answer. See CAL. R. CT.
29.5(b)(4) ("[T]he answer provided by the California Supreme Court will be followed by the certifying court."). For the reasons set forth earlier in this Article,
however, the authors do not believe that this language is necessary to compel certifying courts to accept the certified answer. See supra text accompanying notes 152-55.
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demonstrate that the docket control pit bull is, in reality, a tame lap
dog. There is no reason to believe that the New Jersey dog would be
any more vicious.
The New Jersey judiciary's reluctance to adopt a certification
procedure is difficult to harmonize with its long-standing position as
a legal innovator. Certification has received the almost universal
blessing of scholars and state and federal judges who have utilized it.
It has been analyzed academically and tested in state and federal
courthouses across the county and has been found to function properly. Certification works, and New Jersey should join its sister states
in adopting this useful procedure.

